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WORK MADE FOR HIRE— 
ANALYZING THE MULTIFACTOR BALANCING TEST 
RYAN VACCA* 
ABSTRACT 
 Authorship of copyrighted works is oftentimes controlled by the 1976 Copyright Act’s 
work made for hire doctrine. This doctrine states that works created by employees within the 
scope of their employment result in the employer, not the employee, being the author and 
initial copyright owner. One key determination in this analysis is whether the hired party is 
an employee or independent contractor. In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court, in CCNV v. Reid, 
set forth a list of factors to distinguish employees from independent contractors. Unfortu-
nately, the Supreme Court did not give further guidance on how to balance these factors. 
Three years later, in 1992, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Aymes v. 
Bonelli and noted that not all factors are equally weighted and that five of the factors would 
―be significant in virtually every situation.‖ This analysis was supported by looking at all 
the work made for hire cases decided in the three year period since Reid—six cases in total. 
This Article expands in both scope and time what the Second Circuit did in Aymes and 
systematically analyzes how courts have utilized the factors in the twenty-five years since 
Reid. In particular, this study has identified the universe of cases where the courts have 
decided whether a hired party was an employee or independent contractor and uses the data 
from these cases to describe what factors appear to be the most and least important in reach-
ing these conclusions. Based on the results of this study, this Article proposes a continuum 
of importance, which graphically illustrates the relative importance of each factor. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Authorship plays a central role in copyright law.1 Conferring this 
title on people or entities bestows on them initial ownership of the 
copyright2 and the power to exploit the associated rights.3 Hence, it is 
no surprise that authorship is an oft-disputed issue between parties 
contesting the use of copyrighted works.4 
 In many circumstances, determining authorship is easy, because 
the general rule is that ―the author is the party who actually creates 
the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tan-
gible expression . . . .‖5 The artist who paints a bowl of fruit in her 
home studio on the weekend to sell at a community art show is an 
easy example of the traditional notion of authorship. The glaring ex-
ception to this general rule is the ―work made for hire‖ doctrine. In 
part, this doctrine provides that ―a work prepared by an employee 
within the scope of his or her employment‖6 is consequently owned by 
the employer.7 But the work made for hire doctrine does not simply 
                                                                                                                                       
 1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (―Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.‖ (emphasis add-
ed)); see also Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of ―Author-
ship,‖ 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 455 (1991) (― ‗[A]uthorship‘ . . . is arguably the most central, and 
certainly the most resonant, of the foundational concepts associated with Anglo-American 
copyright doctrine.‖). 
 2. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). 
 3. Id. § 106 (―[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do 
and to authorize any of the following[]. . . .‖); id. § 106A(a)(1) (―[T]he author of a work of 
visual art—shall have the right[]. . . .‖). 
 4. See, e.g., JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2010); Martha Graham 
Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 
624 (2d Cir. 2004); Numbers Licensing, L.L.C. v. bVisual USA, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1245 
(E.D. Wash. 2009); Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2008); 
Int‘l Code Council, Inc. v. Nat‘l Fire Prot. Ass‘n, No. 02C5610, 2006 WL 850879 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 27, 2006); Brower v. Martin, 446 F. Supp. 2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 5. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989). 
 6. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining work made for hire). 
 7. Id. § 201(b). 
2014]  WORK MADE FOR HIRE 199 
 
change initial ownership of the copyright.8 This doctrine has found its 
way into several other issues, such as modifying the duration of the 
copyright,9 eliminating the right to terminate transfers of copyright,10 
and prohibiting the acquisition of moral rights.11 
 But unlike Hamlet, where the question was ―to be, or not to be,‖12 
for the work made for hire doctrine, the question is ―employee or in-
dependent contractor?‖ Distinguishing between employees and inde-
pendent contractors under the 1976 Copyright Act‘s work made for 
hire doctrine is an essential problem courts and parties need to re-
solve before proceeding to analyze how ownership, duration, termina-
tions of transfers, and moral rights are affected.13 
 Twenty-five years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to give 
guidance to judges and parties involved in disputes over the employ-
ment status of hired individuals.14 In 1989, the Court issued its opin-
ion in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid15 and declared 
that distinguishing employees from independent contractors should 
be accomplished by using a multifactor balancing test.16 This test, 
which uses approximately a dozen factors, clarified what the proper 
test was but spawned questions about how those factors are balanced 
and which factors, if any, are the most important in the analysis.17 
 Three years after Reid, the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit decided Aymes v. Bonelli and noted that not all factors are equal-
ly weighted.18 The court in Aymes went further still and opined that 
five of the factors would ―be significant in virtually every situation.‖19 
                                                                                                                                       
 8. Jon M. Garon & Elaine D. Ziff, The Work Made for Hire Doctrine Revisited: 
Startup and Technology Employees and the Use of Contracts in a Hiring Relationship, 12 
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 489, 490 (2011). 
 9. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (providing that copyright generally persists for the life 
of the author plus seventy years), with id. § 302(c) (providing that copyright in a work 
made for hire ―endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a 
term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first‖). 
 10. Id. § 203(a) (―In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, the exclu-
sive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a copy-
right[]. . . is subject to termination . . . .‖); see also id. § 304(c), (d) (same exclusion but ap-
plied to a different set of transfers). 
 11. See id. § 106A(a) (granting moral rights to ―the author of a work of visual art‖); 
id. § 101(2)(B) (defining ―work of visual art‖ as not including a work made for hire). 
 12. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act III, sc. 1. 
 13. See Garon & Ziff, supra note 8. 
 14. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. at 751-52. 
 17. See infra Parts II.E–F. 
 18. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 19. Id. 
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This analysis was supported by reviewing all the work made for hire 
cases decided in the three-year period since Reid—six cases in total.20 
 This Article greatly expands upon the Second Circuit‘s work in 
Aymes. It is the first study to comprehensively and systematically 
analyze the work made for hire factors and show their relative im-
portance in distinguishing employees from independent contractors. 
It contributes to the existing and highly-regarded literature of empir-
ical studies analyzing multifactor tests.21 Using a data set consisting 
of the population of work made for hire cases decided since Reid 
where the courts determined the status of the hired party, this Arti-
cle illustrates which factors are the most and least important in 
drawing this distinction. These results confirm, in part, what the Se-
cond Circuit in Aymes believed—that a small subset of factors is im-
portant.22 Likewise, these results show that some factors originally 
thought to be important are not terribly important and that other 
factors originally thought to be of only moderate importance are ac-
tually very important.23 
 Part II provides historical background on the work made for hire 
doctrine and illustrates how the doctrine has evolved from when its 
foundation was laid in the mid-1800s through the Second Circuit‘s 
1992 decision in Aymes.24 Specifically, during the course of this dis-
cussion, I describe the legislative histories leading up to the codifica-
tion of the work made for hire doctrine in the 1976 Copyright Act25 
and the circuit split occurring after its enactment, which eventually 
led to the Supreme Court‘s resolution in Reid.26 Part II concludes by 
recounting the Supreme Court‘s rationale for adopting the multifac-
tor test in Reid27 and the Second Circuit‘s explanation of the im-
portant and unimportant factors in Aymes.28 
 Part III describes the methodology and results of this study.29 This 
Part explains the type of data collected, describes how this data is 
used to show four different measures of importance, and displays 
                                                                                                                                       
 20. See id. at 862 (citing six cases decided between 1990 and 1992). 
 21. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trade-
mark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581 (2006); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of 
U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008); Kevin Blum et 
al., Consistency of Confusion? A Fifteen-Year Revisiting of Barton Beebe’s Empirical Analy-
sis of Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2010). 
 22. See infra Part II.F.  
 23. See infra notes 260-61 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra Part II. 
 25. See infra Parts II.A–C. 
 26. See infra Part II.D. 
 27. See infra Part II.E. 
 28. See infra Part II.F. 
 29. See infra Part III.  
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how each factor ranks using each measure.30 Most importantly, based 
on the results of these measures, I propose a continuum of im-
portance for the Reid factors.31 This continuum groups together fac-
tors sharing similar features with respect to the measures of im-
portance.32 Part III concludes by testing how useful the continuum is 
at predicting the ultimate outcome of the work made for hire cases.33 
 Part IV first attempts to situate the results of this study within 
the historical development of the work made for hire doctrine and see 
whether these results cohere with the Supreme Court‘s rationales for 
adopting and rejecting the various interpretations existing before 
Reid.34 Part IV then considers the implications of this study, paying 
attention to litigation and business-planning contexts.35 Special at-
tention is drawn toward terminations of transfers litigation involving 
sound recordings as a case study on how the results of this study may 
ultimately affect the outcome of this impending litigation.36 
II.   AUTHORSHIP AND THE WORK MADE FOR HIRE DOCTRINE 
 To understand the modern work made for hire doctrine, it is nec-
essary to appreciate how it came into being. Many of the changes tak-
ing place in 1976 and subsequent interpretations were heavily influ-
enced by earlier copyright acts and how courts construed the work 
made for hire doctrine. The most significant of these early acts was 
the 1909 Copyright Act. This part of the Article briefly describes the 
work made for hire doctrine during the pre-1909 period and then dis-
cusses the codification of this doctrine in the 1909 Act and how the 
courts gradually, but greatly, modified this doctrine. Afterwards, this 
part describes the legislative history leading to the 1976 Act and the 
final codification in section 101, which left courts struggling with how 
to determine whether a hired party was an employee or independent 
contractor. Next, this part explains the four approaches lower courts 
used in making this determination before the Supreme Court re-
solved the issue in its historic 1989 case—CCNV v. Reid. Finally, it 
describes how the Second Circuit in Aymes v. Bonelli put an addi-
tional gloss on Reid, which serves as the jumping off point for this 
study and is fully explored in Parts III and IV. 
                                                                                                                                       
 30. See infra Part III. 
 31. See infra Fig. 1 in Part III.B. 
 32. See infra Fig. 1 in Part III.B. 
 33. See infra Fig. 2 and preceding discussion in Part III.B.  
 34. See infra Part IV.A. 
 35. See infra Part IV.B.  
 36. See infra Part IV.B.2.  
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A.   Pre-1909 Case Law 
 The earliest appearance of the work made for hire doctrine (or at 
least the foundation for the doctrine) occurred in the 1860s.37 Prior to 
this time, hiring parties were never entitled to the copyright of the 
parties they hired absent an agreement assigning the copyright to 
the hiring party.38 As such, no distinction was drawn between em-
ployees and independent contractors, because hiring parties were not 
entitled to the copyright by virtue of employment.39 
 During the 1860s, a shift occurred and courts began to recognize 
that hiring parties did have a copyright interest in the works pre-
pared by those they hired to create.40 One of the earliest cases laying 
the foundation for the work made for hire doctrine was Keene v. 
Wheatley.41 Keene involved the famous play, Our American Cousin.42 
In relevant part, the British author, Tom Taylor, sold the American 
rights to Laura Keene, a New York City theater owner.43 Joseph Jef-
ferson, an actor in Keene‘s company, adapted the play for perfor-
mance in Keene‘s New York theater.44 The play became a huge suc-
cess in New York, and Jefferson sold his additions in the play to 
Wheatley and John Clark, two Philadelphia theater producers, who 
had previously acquired a British copy of the play.45 After a success-
ful exhibition of the play in Philadelphia, Keene filed suit alleging 
copyright infringement.46 The court held that Keene did not have a 
valid copyright to the original version of the play, because Taylor was 
not a U.S. resident.47 Notwithstanding this ruling, the court also held 
that Keene could seek a remedy against Wheatley and John Clark for 
Jefferson‘s additions to the play.48 As the court explained: 
Mr. Jefferson, while in the general theatrical employment of the 
complainant, engaged in the particular office of assisting in the 
adaptation of this play; and made the additions in question in the 
course of his willing performance of this duty. She consequently 
                                                                                                                                       
 37. Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-For-Hire Doctrine, 15 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 5 (2003) (―The concept began to appear after 1860.‖). 
 38. Id. at 32. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Keene v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 7644). 
 42. Id. at 181. Our American Cousin is famously known as the play occurring at 
Ford‘s Theater the night President Lincoln was assassinated by John Wilkes Booth. Fisk, 
supra note 37, at 38 n.125. 
 43. Keene, 14 F. Cas. at 182. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Fisk, supra note 37, at 37-38. 
 46. Keene, 14 F. Cas. at 184. 
 47. Id. at 185; Fisk, supra note 37, at 39-40. 
 48. Fisk, supra note 37, at 40. 
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became the proprietor of them as products of his intellectual exer-
tion in a particular service in her employment.49 
In particular, the court declined to hold that Keene was entitled to 
the copyright as a matter of statutory copyright law but, instead, 
based its holding on equitable principles.50  
 Eight years later, in Lawrence v. Dana,51 a federal court collapsed 
the distinction between statutory copyright law and equitable princi-
ples.52 Lawrence involved an international law treatise written by 
Henry Wheaton.53 Upon Henry Wheaton‘s death, his wife, Catharine, 
sought the assistance of William Lawrence to prepare a new edition 
of the treatise.54 As part of the agreement between Catharine and 
Lawrence, Catharine agreed to not make use of Lawrence‘s notes in a 
new edition of the treatise without his consent.55 Subsequent litiga-
tion over the treatise ensued, and in dictum the court indicated that 
had the parties not entered into a contract for Lawrence to retain the 
copyright, Catharine would have owned the copyright because of the 
employment relationship between them.56 This dictum was repeated 
throughout the rest of the nineteenth century as courts reallocated 
copyright ownership by including an implied contract between the 
parties that favored the hiring party owning the copyright.57 Despite 
courts entertaining the idea of the hiring party owning the copyright 
in the absence of an express assignment to that effect, there was con-
fusion about whether the default rule favored the hiring or hired par-
ty.58 The cause for this shift from a default rule of hired party owner-
ship to a default rule of hiring party ownership is muddled.59 None-
theless, one thing is clear—the courts deciding copyright cases during 
this period drew no distinction between employees and independent 
contractors like is done in the modern context.60 
                                                                                                                                       
 49. Keene, 14 F. Cas. at 187. 
 50. Id.; Fisk, supra note 37, at 40. 
 51. 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136). 
 52. Fisk, supra note 37, at 43. 
 53. Lawrence, 15 F. Cas. at 26. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 51; Fisk, supra note 37, at 43. 
 57. Fisk, supra note 37, at 45. 
 58. Id. at 47 (―By the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the law of employee 
copyrights was highly uncertain and the results of cases were quite unpredictable.‖). 
 59. Id. at 45 (suggesting the cause of this shift was based on (1) reflecting the intent of 
most parties, (2) employers having a stronger moral claim, or (3) changing assumptions 
about the nature of authorship). 
 60. Id. at 46.  
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 It was not until nearly the turn of the century that the principle of 
hiring party-owned copyrights was more firmly established.61 In 
1899, the court in Colliery Engineer Co. v. United Correspondence 
Schools62 noted that it was the employer of a salaried employee who 
was the copyright owner of instructional materials for a correspond-
ence school.63 The following year, the court in Dielman v. White64 held 
that ―when an artist is commissioned to execute a work of art not in 
existence at the time the commission is given, the burden of proving 
that he retains a copyright in the work of art executed, sold, and de-
livered under the commission rests heavily upon the artist himself.‖65 
B.   The 1909 Act 
 After an uncertain history, Congress finally recognized the work 
made for hire doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1909.66 The 1909 Act 
provided that ―the word ‗author‘ shall include an employer in the case 
of works made for hire.‖67 This provision of the 1909 Act resulted 
from a meeting in 1905 between industry leaders and the American 
Authors‘ League.68 The initial draft stated that only ―authors‖ could 
obtain copyright, but industry leaders objected.69 The Copyright Of-
fice proposed a revised bill that did not have a general work made for 
hire provision, but instead had a section indicating that the ―publisher 
of a composite or collective work . . . which has been produced at his 
instance and expense‖ would be entitled to a copyright.70 However, in-
dustry leaders were still unsatisfied. As one participant complained: 
We have people who work for us who make engravings or etchings 
for us under salary. Under the new law—if it becomes a law as 
drafted—they would have the right to copyright, and I think it 
would be well to express in such a law that where no agreement 
exists to the contrary the payment of a salary to an employee shall 
entitle an employer to all rights to obtain a copyright in any work 
                                                                                                                                       
 61. Id. at 55. 
 62. Colliery Eng‘r Co. v. United Correspondence Sch. Co., 94 F. 152 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899). 
 63. Fisk, supra note 37, at 59-60. 
 64. Dielman v. White, 102 F. 892 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900). 
 65. Id. at 894. 
 66. Michael B. Landau, ―Works Made For Hire‖ After Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid: The Need for Statutory Reform and the Importance of Contract, 9 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 107, 110 (1990). 
 67. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1088 (repealed 1976). 
 68. Fisk, supra note 37, at 63. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 64 (citing 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT xxiv (B. Ful-
ton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976)). 
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performed during the hours for which such salary is paid. It seems 
to me these things should not be left to the courts to decide.71 
Interestingly, this comment indicates that some industry leaders be-
lieved that the copyright in works created by salaried employees dur-
ing their employment would belong to the employer.72 The Copyright 
Office was persuaded by such comments and prepared another draft 
of the bill, which credited authorship to ―[a]n employer, in the case of 
a work produced by an employee during the hours for which his sala-
ry is paid, subject to any agreement to the contrary.‖73 Later, in 1906, 
Congress held joint hearings and produced the language ultimately 
ending up in the 1909 Act—―the word ‗author‘ shall include an em-
ployer in the case of works made for hire.‖74 Unfortunately, Congress 
failed to define ―work made for hire‖ and ―employer.‖75 
 One of the earliest cases interpreting the 1909 Act‘s work made for 
hire provision was National Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman.76 In Kauf-
man, the plaintiff, a corporation, claimed a copyright in a fashion 
book.77 The defendant reproduced portions of this book and, when sued 
for copyright infringement, moved to dismiss.78 In the course of its 
opinion, the Second Circuit discussed the newly enacted 1909 Act and 
the work made for hire doctrine.79 Importantly, the court noted that 
―[under the previous law], as well as now, the employer had the right 
to the copyright in the literary product of a salaried employ[ee].‖80 
 The last major development in the work made for hire doctrine 
before enactment of the 1976 Act was Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. 
Winmill Publishing Corp.81 In Brattleboro, newspaper advertisers 
hired the Brattleboro Daily Reformer, a local newspaper, to create 
advertisements.82 These advertisements appeared in the Brattleboro 
Daily Reformer and subsequently appeared in the Brattleboro Town 
Crier, a direct-mail circular.83 The Brattleboro Daily Reformer sued 
the Brattleboro Town Crier for copyright infringement for reproduc-
                                                                                                                                       
 71. Id. (citing LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 70, at 65). 
 72. See id. (citing LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 70, at 65). 
 73. Id. at 66 (citing LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 70, at xxx). 
 74. Id. (citing LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 70, pt. J). 
 75. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 5.03[B][1][a][i] (2014). 
 76. Nat‘l Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman, 189 F. 215 (C.C.M.D. Pa. 1911). 
 77. Id. at 216. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 217.  
 80. Id. (emphasis added). 
 81. Brattleboro Publ‘g Co. v. Winmill Publ‘g Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 82. Id. at 568. 
 83. Id. at 567. 
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ing the advertisements.84 On appeal, the Second Circuit stated that 
in determining whether a work was a work made for hire under the 
1909 Act, it applied the ―instance and expense‖ test.85 That is, the 
copyright is owned by ―the person at whose instance and expense the 
work is done.‖86 In Brattleboro, the court held that the advertisers, 
who hired the newspaper, were the copyright owners of the adver-
tisements.87 Importantly, the Second Circuit opined that the ―in-
stance and expense‖ test applied regardless of whether the hired par-
ty was a traditional employee or an independent contractor.88 Col-
lapsing the distinction between employees and independent contrac-
tors laid the foundation for some of the confusion arising from the 
1976 Act‘s work made for hire provision. 
C.   The 1976 Act—Legislative History and Statutory Text 
 The deluge of technological advancements created in the wake of 
the 1909 Act caused the judges interpreting it to stretch the statutory 
language to its limits to accommodate these developments.89 As a re-
sult, in 1955, Congress decided to overhaul the 1909 Act, which in-
cluded funding thirty-five studies on copyright issues.90 One of these 
studies, study number thirteen, published in 1958, focused on the 
work made for hire issue and reported the then-current state of the 
law under the 1909 Act.91  
 Based on these studies, the Copyright Office prepared a report on 
copyright law revisions, including recommendations on how to deal 
with the work made for hire issues.92 This 1961 report recommended 
that works made for hire be defined as ―works created by an employ-
ee within the regular scope of his employment‖93 and suggested that 
commissioned works fell outside this definition.94 Following publica-
                                                                                                                                       
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 568.  
 88. Id. at 567-68; see also Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Gra-
ham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 635 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 89. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL 
L. REV. 857, 857-58 (1987). 
 90. I.T. Hardy, Copyright Law’s Concept of Employment—What Congress Really In-
tended, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y U.S.A. 210, 222 (1988); Litman, supra note 89, at 872. 
 91. See Borge Varmer, Works Made for Hire and on Commission (1958), reprinted in 
STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS 
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 
(Comm. Print 1960). 
 92. H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: 
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT 
LAW (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter 1961 REG. REP.]; Hardy, supra note 90, at 224. 
 93. 1961 REG. REP., supra note 92, at app. 14–114; Hardy, supra note 90, at 224. 
 94. 1961 REG. REP., supra note 92, at app. 14–113, 14–114; Hardy, supra note 90, at 224. 
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tion of the 1961 report, stakeholders voiced their concerns about the 
recommendations.95 One objection lodged by the motion picture in-
dustry concerned the use of the phrase ―regular scope of employment‖ 
in the definition.96 The movie studios thought this language narrowed 
what the studios had typically been able to claim as their own.97 None 
of the objections concerned the understanding of what the term ―em-
ployee‖ meant.98 In fact, as Professor Trotter Hardy describes it, the 
comments to the 1961 report implicitly recognized ―employee‖ to 
mean formal employees—those paid on a regular schedule.99 
 After these discussions, the Copyright Office published a ―Prelim-
inary Draft Bill‖ in 1963.100 This bill defined work made for hire as ―a 
work prepared by an employee within the scope of the duties of his 
employment, but not including a work made on special order or com-
mission.‖101 Although the 1963 Preliminary Draft Bill included a few 
changes to the work made for hire doctrine, it did not define the term 
―employee.‖102 Stakeholders‘ understanding of the term ―employee‖ 
became clear as a result of the objections to the provision in the 1963 
Preliminary Draft Bill stating that specially ordered or commissioned 
works were not works made for hire.103 As the stakeholders argued 
about the status of commissioned works, they frequently contrasted 
commissioned individuals with employees.104 Again, as Professor 
Hardy articulately describes, these references to employees almost 
always describe employees as individuals who were formal employ-
ees—those who were on the payroll and paid a regular salary.105 
                                                                                                                                       
 95. Hardy, supra note 90, at 225-28; Landau, supra note 66, at 115. 
 96. Hardy, supra note 90, at 225 n.66. 
 97. See id. Another objection to the proposal was that employers would not be consid-
ered authors, but merely owners of the copyright. Id. at 226. 
 98. H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS., DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS 
ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. 
COPYRIGHT LAW 152-60 (Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter 1963 REG. REP.].  
 99. Hardy, supra note 90, at 226-27. 
 100. Id. at 228; Landau, supra note 66, at 115. 
 101. Hardy, supra note 90, at 228 (emphasis added); see also Landau, supra note 66, 
at 115. 
 102. Hardy, supra note 90, at 229. 
 103. Id. at 232-35. The debate about commissioned works was that federal copyright 
law would preempt common law copyright, which had treated hiring parties that commis-
sioned works as the copyright owner. In effect, commissioned works were treated similarly 
to employee-created works, but with preemption in effect that common law development 
would no longer exist and the hiring party would not own the copyright unless the hired 
party agreed to assign it. This, in conjunction with the introduction of the termination of 
transfer provisions, which did not apply to works made for hire, caused much consternation 
for film, textbook, and reference publishers. Id. at 229-32. 
 104. Id. at 232-35. 
 105. Id.  
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 Following this set of discussions, Congress introduced the 1964 
bill,106 which included commissioned works within the definition of 
―work made for hire.‖107 In fact, the 1964 bill provided that any special-
ly ordered or commissioned work would be a work made for hire ―if the 
parties so agree[d] in writing.‖108 This one hundred eighty degree 
change on specially commissioned works raised objections from indi-
vidual creators who had been routinely hired as independent contrac-
tors, especially members of the Authors League.109 After much ha-
ranguing, the two sides of the work made for hire debate were able to 
find some common ground and agreed that some types of specially 
commissioned works should be works made for hire, while other types 
were not appropriate for that treatment.110 Because the focus of this 
round of discussions centered on specially commissioned parties, rather 
than employees, nothing was said on what constituted an employee.111 
 At last, in 1965, Congress introduced two bills112 which defined 
―work made for hire‖ as ―a work prepared by an employee within the 
scope of his or her employment‖113 and also specially ordered or com-
missioned works falling within four categories of works, including a 
contribution to a collective work, parts of a motion picture, transla-
tions, and supplementary works, if the parties expressly agreed in 
writing that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.114 Af-
ter further discussions, this list of categories was expanded to include 
compilations, instructional texts, tests, atlases, and answer materials 
for a test.115 In the Congressional hearing, industry witnesses again 
                                                                                                                                       
 106. Technically, Congress introduced three identical bills—S. 3008, H.R. 11947, and 
H.R. 12354. For the sake of simplicity I refer to them collectively as the ―1964 bill.‖ See 
Hardy, supra note 90, at 236. 
 107. Landau, supra note 66, at 115. 
 108. Hardy, supra note 90, at 236; Landau, supra note 66, at 115. 
 109. Hardy, supra note 90, at 237. These individuals were concerned that they could 
easily be forced to sign a contract declaring that the work was a work made for hire and, as 
a result, their termination rights would never exist. Landau, supra note 66, at 115-16. 
 110. Hardy, supra note 90, at 238. 
 111. See generally 1963 REG. REP., supra note 98 (some commentators noting their 
concerns about including specially commissioned works resulting in too little protection for 
authors; some commentators noting that a substantial percentage of audio-visual materials 
are specially commissioned and that the proposed law needs to be changed).  
 112. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON THE 
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (Comm. Print 1965). 
 113. Landau, supra note 66, at 116 (internal quotations omitted). 
 114. Hardy, supra note 90, at 238-40; Landau, supra note 66, at 116. One of the driving 
forces behind these debates about the work made for hire definition was the new termina-
tion of transfers provisions. See Landau, supra note 66, at 116 (―[I]n exchange for conces-
sions from publishers on provisions relating to termination rights, the authors consented to 
a second subsection . . . .‖). 
 115. Landau, supra note 66 at 117. The stakeholders involved in negotiating these 
categories—hence the seemingly random collection of included works—were representa-
tives of the Authors League of America, the Ad Hoc Committee on Educational Institutions 
and Organizations, the American Guild of Authors and Composers, the American Textbook 
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focused on the specially commissioned works; but in reference to this 
issue, they explained their understanding of what an employee was.116 
As they had in the past, the stakeholders considered employees as 
those who were paid a salary for either a fixed or indefinite term.117  
 After more than a decade of debates about the work made for hire 
doctrine, the statutory language had been worked out and was enact-
ed, albeit a decade later, in the 1976 Copyright Act.118 In relevant 
part, the definition of ―work made for hire‖ now reads: 
A ―work made for hire‖ is— 
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her 
employment; or 
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribu-
tion to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other au-
diovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a 
compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material 
for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written 
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a 
work made for hire.119 
Although the 1976 Copyright Act uses the phrase ―a work prepared 
by an employee within the scope of his or her employment,‖ it fails to 
define the term ―employee.‖120 Nonetheless, given the extensive legis-
lative history, one possibility was that everyone understood the term 
to mean those who were formal, salaried employees.121 
D.   Different Interpretations of ―Employee‖ Under the 1976 Act 
 The 1976 Copyright Act went into effect on January 1, 1978, and 
courts were quickly confronted with the task of having to interpret 
the work made for hire language in the statute.122 During the course 
of the following eleven years, the lower courts adopted four different 
tests to determine whether a hired party was an employee under the 
first prong of the work made for hire definition.123 
                                                                                                                                       
Publishers‘ Institute, the American Book Publishers Council, and the Motion Picture Asso-
ciation of America. Litman, supra note 89, at 890-91 nn.216-18. 
 116. Hardy, supra note 90, at 239. 
 117. Id. (discussing the testimony of Adolph Schimel on behalf of the Motion Picture 
Association of America). 
 118. Landau, supra note 66, at 117. 
 119. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining work made for hire). 
 120. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 738 (1989) (internal quota-
tions omitted). 
 121. Hardy, supra note 90, at 241; Litman, supra note 89, at 890. 
 122. Marita Covarrubias, Note, The Supreme Court Sculpts a Definition . . . Is It a 
Work for Hire?, 10 LOY. ENT. L.J. 353, 365 (1990). 
 123. Landau, supra note 66, at 120-21. 
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 1.   Right to Control Test 
 The first test was known as the ―right to control‖ test.124 Under 
this test, courts looked at ―whether the alleged employer has the 
right to direct and supervise the manner in which the writer per-
forms his work.‖125 This test was borrowed from case law interpreting 
the 1909 Act.126  
 One of the first cases adopting the right to control test was Town 
of Clarkstown v. Reeder.127 In Reeder, the town decided to establish a 
civic project, known as a Youth Court.128 As part of this project, the 
town‘s Youth Court Executive Board formed various sub-committees, 
including a Constitution Committee and Steering Committee.129 Mi-
chael Reeder voluntarily served on each of these committees.130 As 
part of his role on the Steering Committee, Reeder was tasked with 
preparing a manual for the Youth Court.131 Reeder drafted the man-
ual ―after receiving conceptual and practical input from many peo-
ple,‖ including guidance from members of the different committees 
and Executive Board.132 The chairman of the Executive Board relayed 
feedback from the committees to Reeder and served as a sounding 
board as Reeder prepared the manual.133 
 Shortly after the manual was complete, Reeder contracted with 
another town to help them create a Youth Court and asserted a copy-
right in the Clarkstown manual.134 Initially, Reeder granted Clarks-
town a license, but after the Executive Committee requested Reeder 
to assign the copyright to the town, Reeder revoked the license and 
litigation ensued.135 At issue was whether Reeder was an employee of 
the town and, as a result, whether the manual was a work made for 
hire with the copyright belonging to the town.136 
 The court held that Reeder, despite the fact that he volunteered 
his time, was the town‘s employee.137 The court held that the crucial 
factor in determining whether Reeder was an employee ―is whether 
                                                                                                                                       
 124. Reid, 490 U.S. at 738. 
 125. Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 126. See id. (citing Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737, 744 (2d 
Cir. 1975); Roy Exp. Co. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. at 137-38. 
 129. Id. at 138. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 139.  
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 139-40. 
 136. Id. at 140-41. 
 137. Id. at 141-42.  
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the alleged employer has the right to direct and supervise the man-
ner in which the writer performs his work.‖138 The town had this 
right to direct and supervise the manner in which the manual was 
created because (1) the Chairman of the Executive Board had the 
power to remove and appoint members; (2) Reeder and the Chairman 
had ongoing discussions about drafting the manual, including what 
to include and change; (3) the Chairman assigned Reeder and anoth-
er volunteer to prepare other documents and they did; and (4) Reeder 
submitted proposals to the committees and Executive Board for ap-
proval.139 The fact that no one from the town ever ordered Reeder to 
write the manual in a specific format was not dispositive.140 The court 
emphasized that the employment relationship depended on having 
the right to control, not exercising the right.141 
 The court‘s justification for this interpretation of the term ―employ-
ee‖ in the 1976 Act leaves much to be desired. Rather than looking at 
the legislative history of the 1976 Act, the court reached its conclusion 
about how to distinguish employees from independent contractors by 
relying on three cases interpreting the muddled 1909 Act.142 
 2.   Actual Control Test 
 The second test used by the courts following enactment of the 
1976 Act was the ―actual control‖ test.143 This was a variation of the 
right to control test.144 Under the actual control test, courts did not 
just look at whether the hiring party could control or direct the work, 
but looked at whether the hiring party actually asserted control over 
the creation of the work.145  
 The leading case on the actual control test is the Second Circuit‘s 
Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.146 In that case, the plaintiff, 
Aldon, was in the business of designing and selling figurines.147 One 
of Aldon‘s principals, Arthur Ginsberg, handled the creative aspects 
of the company, including product-design.148 In anticipation of a new 
                                                                                                                                       
 138. Id. at 141 (internal quotations omitted).  
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 142. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. at 140-41; see supra final sentence in Part II.B. 
 143. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989). 
 144. Id. at 738-39.  
 145. Id. at 742; Landau, supra note 66, at 123. 
 146. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 147. Id. at 549. 
 148. Id.  
212  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Vol. 42:197 
 
line of mythological porcelain statuettes, Ginsberg contacted a Japa-
nese firm, Wado, about making models for the porcelain statuettes.149 
 In addition to describing the pose of the porcelain statuettes and 
sending drawings to Wado, Ginsberg traveled to Japan and worked 
with the Wado artists to develop the porcelain statuette models.150 
Working with the artists included Ginsberg spending ―hours and 
hours changing shapes, adjusting attitudes and proportions‖ in addi-
tion to giving specific directions to the artists on where to position 
the figures‘ heads, legs, and hair.151 Afterwards, Aldon decided to de-
velop brass versions of the statuettes and contacted a Taiwanese 
firm, Unibright, about creating brass models that differed from the 
porcelain models.152 Ginsberg traveled to Taiwan and worked with 
Unibright‘s artists in the same way he worked with Wado‘s artists.153 
 After Aldon began selling the statuettes, a buyer for Spiegel inspect-
ed the statuettes at a trade show and requested a sample.154 Aldon sent 
the samples and a few months later discovered Spiegel selling identical 
statuettes in its catalogue.155 Aldon sued for copyright infringement and 
prevailed at trial, including on the issue of whether the models created 
by Wado and Unibright were works made for hire.156 
 On appeal, Spiegel argued that Wado and Unibright, not Aldon, 
were the copyright owners (i.e. the models were not works made for 
hire).157 The Second Circuit disagreed and held that the Wado and 
Unibright artists were employees working within the scope of their 
employment, because ―Ginsberg did much more than communicate a 
general concept or idea to the [artists], leaving creation of the expres-
sion solely to them.‖158 The court was persuaded by the fact that 
―Ginsberg actively supervised and directed the creation‖ of the de-
signs and that although he did not ―physically wield the sketching 
pen and sculpting tools, he stood over the artists and artisans at crit-
ical stages of the process, telling them exactly what to do.‖159  
 In adopting the actual control test, the Second Circuit cited to sev-
eral cases interpreting the 1909 Act and noted that there was 
―[n]othing in the 1976 Act or its legislative history indicat[ing] that 
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Congress intended to dispense with this prior law . . . .‖160 Rather 
than dissecting the legislative history as Professor Hardy has done, 
the court concluded that Congress did not intend to narrow what was 
meant by ―employee,‖ because there would surely have been some 
discussion of this in the legislative history.161 In addition to the Se-
cond Circuit, the actual control test was adopted by the Fourth and 
Seventh Circuits.162 
 3.   Agency Test 
 The third test used by the courts following enactment of the 1976 
Act was the ―agency‖ test.163 Under this test, courts determined 
whether a hired party was an employee or independent contractor by 
using the meaning of the word ―employee‖ as understood under agen-
cy law.164 Although there was no federal agency law, the courts sug-
gested using the Restatement (Second) of Agency as a guide.165 Ac-
cording to the Restatement, courts consider the following factors in 
distinguishing between employees and independent contractors: 
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may 
exercise over the details of the work; 
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct oc-
cupation or business; 
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the local-
ity, the work is usually done under the direction of the em-
ployer or by a specialist without supervision; 
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instru-
mentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing 
the work; 
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed; 
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; 
                                                                                                                                       
 160. Id. at 552.  
 161. Id.  
 162. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989); see Brunswick 
Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publ‘g Co., 810 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1987) (―[T]here is no 
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 163. Reid, 490 U.S. at 739. 
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815 F.2d 323, 334-35 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 165. Id. at 335. 
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(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the 
employer; 
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the rela-
tion of master and servant; and 
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.166 
 The leading case using the agency test was the Fifth Circuit‘s de-
cision in Easter Seal.167 Easter Seal involved a videotape of a staged 
Mardi Gras style parade.168 A representative of the Easter Seal Socie-
ty entered into a contract with a television station to film the parade 
and edit it to be a sixteen-minute segment for the Easter Seal Socie-
ty‘s telethon.169 The Easter Seal Society representative gave some 
suggestions to Mr. Beyer, the head of the film crew, including camera 
locations, scenes to look for during the parade, and camera angles.170 
However, it was not clear whether Mr. Beyer followed these sugges-
tions.171 In addition, the Easter Seal Society did not control technical 
issues, such as lighting, sound, and color balance.172 Mr. Beyer made 
all decisions on aesthetics and technical issues concerning the cam-
eras and sound equipment.173  
 After being aired nationally, the television station permitted a 
Canadian television producer to use pieces of the film footage.174 As it 
turned out, the Canadian producer used the film in an adult film, 
Candy, the Stripper.175 Candy, the Stripper was distributed and 
shown nationally by Playboy and others.176 After learning about this, 
Easter Seal Society filed suit alleging copyright infringement.177 The 
district court held Mr. Beyer was not an employee of the Easter Seal 
Society, and therefore, the television station, which did employ Mr. 
Beyer, owned the copyright in the film.178 
 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit considered three different interpreta-
tions of what constituted an employee for work made for hire purpos-
es and analyzed the problems associated with each.179 The Fifth Cir-
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 167. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d 323. 
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2014]  WORK MADE FOR HIRE 215 
 
cuit discussed a variation of the right to control test and described  
it as ignoring the distinction between employees and independent 
contractors.180 Under this test, the courts focus on whether the work 
was done at the instance and expense of the hiring party and ask 
whether the hiring party had the right to control the work.181 The 
Fifth Circuit criticized this test as making the nine categories of 
works under § 101(2) ―completely mysterious‖182 and also not deviat-
ing from the interpretation of work made for hire under the 1909 Act, 
despite a belief that Congress was trying to ―tighten up the ‗work for 
hire‘ doctrine under the 1976 Act.‖183 
 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit was critical of the Second Circuit‘s ac-
tual control test in Aldon.184 The Fifth Circuit was concerned that the 
actual control test could result in a lack of consistency between the 
same buyer and seller if more than one work were produced.185 More-
over, the Fifth Circuit thought the test was overly complicated, be-
cause if a formal, salaried employee were hired, but the work was not 
actually supervised by the employer, then the employer‘s copyright 
would be lost and this ―would be almost unimaginable.‖186 Finally, the 
Fifth Circuit criticized the actual control test, because it easily slid 
into the right to control test.187 
 The Fifth Circuit was also critical of the agency test.188 The court 
thought that such an interpretation was radically different from the 
work made for hire doctrine under the 1909 Act, and the court was 
not sure Congress had this in mind.189 Despite these concerns, the 
Fifth Circuit adopted the agency test because it: (1) made sense out of 
the specially commissioned works categories in § 101(2); (2) tied the 
meaning of ―work made for hire‖ to a well-developed doctrine in 
agency law; (3) enhanced predictability; and (4) created a ―moral 
symmetry‖ with others areas of the law, such as the employer being 
liable under the theory of respondeat superior.190 
                                                                                                                                       
 180. Id. at 331.  
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 182. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 331. 
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. at 333-34. 
 185. Id. at 333.  
 186. Id. at 334. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 330-31.  
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. at 335. Although the other justifications are probably self-evident, with respect 
to the fourth justification—moral symmetry—the Fifth Circuit explained ―a buyer is a 
statutory ‗author‘ if and only if he is responsible for the negligent acts of the seller. For 
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 4.   Formal, Salaried Employee Test 
 The final test used by the courts following enactment of the 1976 
Act was the ―formal, salaried employee‖ test.191 Under this test, 
courts initially looked to see if the hired party ―[held] himself or her-
self out as a freelancer.‖192 If so, then the hiring party should have 
anticipated the work not being a work made for hire.193 If the rela-
tionship was ambiguous, then a variety of factors were examined, 
most of which were a subset of the factors identified under the agen-
cy test.194 These factors included:  
(1) whether the [hired party] worked in his or her own studio or on 
the premises of the [hiring party]; (2) whether the [hiring party] is 
in the regular business of creating works of the type purchased; 
(3) whether the [hired party] works for several [hiring parties] at a 
time, or exclusively for one; (4) whether the [hiring party] retains 
authority to assign additional projects to the [hired party]; (5) the 
tax treatment of the relationship by the parties; (6) whether the 
[hired party] is hired through the channels the [hiring party] cus-
tomarily uses for hiring new employees; (7) whether the [hired 
party] is paid a salary or wages, or is paid a flat fee; and 
(8) whether the [hired party] obtains from the [hiring party] all 
benefits customarily extended to its regular employees.195 
Importantly, the formal, salaried employee test does not inquire into 
the degree of control and input the hiring party exercises.196 
 The leading case using the formal, salaried employee test was the 
Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Dumas v. Gommerman.197 In Dumas, ITT 
Cannon contracted with graphic artist Patrick Nagel to produce four 
paintings that ITT would give out as sets of lithographs to ITT Can-
non‘s distributors as part of a promotional campaign.198 ITT Cannon‘s 
advertising agency determined the content and some parts of the de-
sign, borders, and placement of figures and gave Nagel sketches for 
him to use in making the illustrations.199 After paying for the paint-
ings and distributing some lithograph sets, ITT Cannon had some 
lithographs leftover and eventually sold some to Stefan Gommerman, 
                                                                                                                                       
example, a buyer will only be the ‗author‘ of a writing if he would be liable under re-
spondeat superior in a defamation action based on that writing.‖ Id. 
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an art gallery owner.200 In addition to purchasing the lithographs, 
Gommerman purchased ITT Cannon‘s copyrights in the works.201 
 Nagel‘s widow, Jennifer Dumas, became the successor in interest 
in Nagel‘s copyrights.202 After learning about ITT Cannon‘s purported 
transfer of the copyrights to Gommerman, Dumas objected to Gom-
merman‘s reproduction and sales of the paintings, claimed she was 
the copyright owner because Nagel was an independent contractor, 
and filed suit for copyright infringement.203 Gommerman defended by 
arguing that the paintings were works made for hire, because Nagel 
was ITT Cannon‘s employee.204 The district court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction in favor of Dumas and Gommerman appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit.205 
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit perused the legislative history of the 
1976 Copyright Act and acknowledged that the final work made for 
hire language in the statute was the result of a negotiated compro-
mise.206 The court was reluctant to upset that compromise.207 In ana-
lyzing the legislative history, the Ninth Circuit determined that the 
negotiating parties used the term ―employee‖ when referring to ―a sal-
aried worker in a long-term position.‖208 Because ITT Cannon conceded 
that Nagel was not a formal, salaried employee, the paintings were not 
works made for hire, and the court affirmed the district court.209 
 The Ninth Circuit recognized that other courts had utilized differ-
ent tests but criticized those interpretations.210 In particular, the 
Ninth Circuit opined that the Second Circuit‘s actual control test 
from Aldon failed to recognize that the 1976 Act was trying to sub-
stantively change copyright law under the 1909 Act and that it dis-
torted the balance struck in the negotiations between stakeholders.211 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit‘s criticisms of 
the actual control and right to control tests.212 And although the 
Ninth Circuit largely agreed with the Fifth Circuit‘s agency interpre-
tation in Easter Seal, it did object to the agency test as importing the 
actual control or right to control tests and making it difficult to de-
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termine, ex ante, whether the hired party was an employee or inde-
pendent contractor.213 Instead, by conceiving of employees under the 
formal, salaried employee test, the Ninth Circuit believed there 
would be few disputes concerning the status of the hired party.214 
E.   CCNV v. Reid and the Multifactor Balancing Test 
 Given the four different approaches to determining whether a 
hired party was an employee or independent contractor, it was no 
surprise the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this circuit 
split. On June 5, 1989, the Supreme Court handed down its unani-
mous opinion in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid and 
interpreted what Congress meant by the term ―employee‖ in the work 
made for hire doctrine under the 1976 Act.215 
 CCNV was a nonprofit organization committed to eliminating 
homelessness.216 In 1985, CCNV hired James Earl Reid to produce a 
sculpture for use in a Washington D.C. Christmas pageant.217 Mem-
bers of CCNV conceived the idea of the sculpture as depicting a life-
size nativity scene, but instead of using the Holy Family, the family 
would be homeless people huddled on a steam grate.218 CCNV and 
Reid never signed a written agreement nor did they discuss copy-
right ownership.219 
 During the course of creating the sculpture, CCNV and Reid com-
municated several times about the sculpture design, including the 
position of the family, the items used to hold the family‘s personal 
belongings, and who would serve as models for the family mem-
bers.220 Reid eventually completed the sculpture and it was displayed 
near the pageant site for a month.221 The sculpture was returned to 
Reid for minor repairs while CCNV prepared to take the sculpture on 
tour.222 Reid objected to taking the sculpture on tour and when CCNV 
requested return of the sculpture, Reid refused.223 Both parties 
claimed ownership of the copyright, and CCNV filed suit seeking a 
declaration of ownership.224 
                                                                                                                                       
 213. Id. at 1104.  
 214. Id. at 1105.  
 215. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 731 (1989). 
 216. Id. at 733. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 734. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 735. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
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 The district court, after a two-day bench trial, declared that the 
sculpture was a work made for hire.225 In particular, the district court 
held that Reid was an employee, because CCNV was the motivating 
factor in the production of the work and because CCNV directed 
enough of Reid‘s efforts in creating the sculpture CCNV desired.226 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed and held the sculpture was not 
a work made for hire.227 The D.C. Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit‘s 
agency test from Easter Seal and determined that Reid was an inde-
pendent contractor rather than a CCNV employee.228 
 The Supreme Court, in explaining the meaning of the work made 
for hire language, noted that the 1976 Act does not provide a defini-
tion of the term ―employee‖ and that because of this ambiguity, the 
four interpretations discussed earlier had emerged.229 Ultimately, the 
Court adopted the agency test, because it was ―well established that 
‗[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning 
under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute 
otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the estab-
lished meaning of these terms.‘ ‖230 Because, the Court reasoned, 
Congress used the term ―employee‖ in conjunction with the term 
―scope of employment‖—a widely used term of art in agency law—
and did not use any other language in the statute to indicate that it 
meant something other than the common law notion of the relation-
ship between employers and employees, the common law agency test 
was appropriate.231 
 The Court then fleshed out what it meant by the agency test.232 
First, it stated that in determining whether a hired party is an em-
ployee, ―we consider the hiring party‘s right to control the manner 
and means by which the product is accomplished.‖233 Next, citing sec-
tion 220(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the Court listed 
the following factors as relevant to this inquiry: 
[1] the skill required; [2] the source of the instrumentalities and 
tools; [3] the location of the work; [4] the duration of the relation-
ship between the parties; [5] whether the hiring party has the 
                                                                                                                                       
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 735-36. 
 227. Id. at 736. 
 228. Id. The D.C. Circuit also suggested the possibility that the sculpture could have 
been jointly authored by Reid and CCNV in which case both Reid and CCNV would own 
the copyright; the court remanded the case to the district court on this basis. Id.; see also 
17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012) (describing authors of a joint work as co-owners of the copyright). 
 229. Reid, 490 U.S. at 738-39. 
 230. Id. at 739 (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981)). 
 231. Id. at 740.  
 232. Id. at 751-52.  
 233. Id. at 751. 
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right to assign additional projects to the hired party; [6] the extent 
of the hired party‘s discretion over when and how long to work; 
[7] the method of payment; [8] the hired party‘s role in hiring and 
paying assistants; [9] whether the work is part of the regular busi-
ness of the hiring party; [10] whether the hiring party is in busi-
ness; [11] the provision of employee benefits; and [12] the tax 
treatment of the hired party.234 
Although the Court cited the Restatement for the test, it is interest-
ing to note that the factors listed in Reid do not match up exactly to 
those factors in the Restatement.235 Besides these oversights, the 
Court failed to provide any guidance as to how these factors should 
be balanced other than noting that ―[n]o one of these factors is de-
terminative.‖236 The Court then applied these factors to the facts of 
the case and held that Reid was an independent contractor, not an 
employee, of CCNV, because although CCNV directed Reid‘s work to 
the extent it met their specifications, all of the other factors weighed 
in favor of Reid being an independent contractor.237 
 In the course of justifying the common law agency test, the Court 
explained that this interpretation furthered ―Congress‘ paramount 
goal in revising the 1976 Act of enhancing predictability and certain-
ty of copyright ownership.‖238 In contrast, the actual control test un-
dermined predictability and certainty, because the parties would not 
be able to know until late in the process whether the hiring party had 
actually wielded sufficient control over the hired party.239 Because 
CCNV had conceded that the closely-related right to control test was 
difficult to demonstrate without actual control, the right to control 
test suffered from a similar flaw.240 
 In addition to furthering the policy goals of predictability and cer-
tainty, the Court explained that the right to control test focused on 
                                                                                                                                       
 234. Id. at 751-52 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958)). 
 235. Compare id., with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958); see also 
Assaf Jacob, Tort Made For Hire – Reconsidering the CCNV Case, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 96, 
109 (2009). The Court failed to include some of the Restatement factors and added new 
factors not listed in the Restatement. Id. For example, the Court introduced the following 
factors: ―the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired 
party‘s discretion over when and how long to work; the hired party‘s role in hiring and 
paying assistants; and the provision of employee benefits and tax treatment of the hired 
party.‖ Id. Likewise, ―the Court omitted the following factors listed in the Restatement: 
whether or not the hired party is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; the kind of 
occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the 
direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; and whether or not the 
parties believe they are creating the relations of master and servant.‖ Id. at 110.  
 236. Reid, 490 U.S. at 752. 
 237. Id. at 752-53. 
 238. Id. at 749.  
 239. Id. at 750.  
 240. Id. at 750 n.17.  
2014]  WORK MADE FOR HIRE 221 
 
the relationship between the hiring party and the product, rather 
than the relationship between the hiring and hired parties.241 Accord-
ingly, this focus was misguided, because the work made for hire lan-
guage in section 101 is written in terms of the latter rather than for-
mer.242 Moreover, the right to control test ignored the dichotomy be-
tween works created by employees and specially commissioned 
works, because under the right to control test, a specially commis-
sioned work could also be a work by an employee as long as the hir-
ing party had the right to control the product.243 In short, the right to 
control test would largely eliminate the statutory requirement for 
specially commissioned works of having a signed writing specifying 
the product is a work made for hire.244  
 Notwithstanding the Court‘s critiques of the right to control test, 
the test set forth in Reid seemed to adopt that test as the ultimate 
question in the analysis.245 The confusion in the Court rejecting the 
right to control test while at the same time partially adopting it is 
that the Court explained the right to control test differently than the 
way it was originally stated in Reeder. Under Reeder, the court de-
fined the test as ―whether the alleged employer has the right to direct 
and supervise the manner in which the [hired party] performs his 
work.‖246 This test is nearly identical to the test the Supreme Court 
partially adopts in Reid. The right to control test rejected in Reid was 
slightly different. The Supreme Court‘s criticisms were aimed at a 
test focused on whether ―the hiring party retain[ed] the right to con-
trol the product.‖247 The difference between these two versions of the 
right to control test is that one focuses on the hiring party controlling 
the manner and means of production, whereas the other focuses on 
the hiring party controlling the product.248 The cases the Supreme 
Court cites to in its discussion of the right to control test framed the 
test in terms of the hiring party controlling the manner and means of 
production, rather than the product itself,249 but whether this is a 
meaningful distinction is doubtful.250 
                                                                                                                                       
 241. Id. at 741.  
 242. Id.  
 243. Id. at 741-42. 
 244. Id.  
 245. Id. at 751 (―In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the gen-
eral common law of agency, we consider the hiring party‘s right to control the manner and 
means by which the product is accomplished.‖). 
 246. Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 247. Reid, 490 U.S. at 738 (emphasis added). 
 248. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 75, at § 5.03[B][1][a][iii]. 
 249. Reid, 490 U.S. at 738-39 (citing Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828 (Colo. 
1985) and Reeder, 566 F. Supp. at 142). 
 250. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 75, at § 5.03[B][1][a][iii] (―[T]he distinction may 
import no different result in many cases.‖).  
222  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Vol. 42:197 
 
 The actual control test suffered from a similar problem of failing 
to dichotomize. The Court noted that although a work could be a 
work made for hire under section 101(2) and not under 101(1) if the 
work was specially commissioned, but no actual control was exer-
cised, the Court found there was no support for this distinction in the 
statutory language.251 Finally, the Court summarily rejected the for-
mal, salaried employee test, because although there was some sup-
port for this approach in the legislative history, the work made for 
hire provision used the term ―employee‖ rather than ―formal employ-
ee‖ or ―salaried employee.‖252 In addition, the amici arguing for this 
approach did not agree on the standard for what constituted a ―for-
mal, salaried employee.‖253 
 In sum, the Court‘s decision in Reid settled the question that had 
plagued the lower courts for several years. And, although the lower 
courts now had a multifactor test to help them determine whether 
the hired party was an employee or independent contractor, all they 
were told about the test was that no single factor was dispositive. 
This lack of further guidance led to additional confusion about how 
the factors ought to be applied. 
F.   Weighting Factors—The Aymes v. Bonelli Three-Year Study 
 Following the Supreme Court‘s decision in Reid, the lower courts 
were confronted with how the Reid factors were to be applied. Ac-
cording to the Second Circuit, one district court erred in treating all 
the Reid factors as equally important and simply tallying the factors 
in making its determination.254 To provide the lower courts additional 
guidance in applying the Reid factors, the Second Circuit in Aymes v. 
Bonelli suggested that ―there are some factors that will be significant 
in virtually every situation.‖255 In particular, the Aymes court listed 
the following Reid factors as almost always being relevant and de-
serving of more weight in the multifactor analysis:  
(1) the hiring party‘s right to control the manner and means of 
creation;256 (2) the skill required; (3) the provision of employee 
                                                                                                                                       
 251. Reid, 490 U.S. at 742 (―[T]here is no statutory support for an additional dichotomy 
between commissioned works that are actually controlled and supervised by the hiring 
party and those that are not.‖). 
 252. Id. at 742 n.8. It is worth noting that section 101 also does not use the term em-
ployee as understood by the common law of agency. 
 253. Id.  
 254. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 255. Id.  
 256. Read literally, the hiring party‘s right to control the manner and means of crea-
tion is not one of the Reid factors, but it is the ultimate question that the Reid factors help 
courts determine. As the Supreme Court stated in Reid, ―[i]n determining whether a hired 
party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring par-
ty‘s right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among 
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benefits; (4) the tax treatment of the hired party; and (5) whether 
the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the 
hired party.257 
 Of these important factors, the Second Circuit additionally noted 
that the employee benefits and tax treatment factors were especially 
probative, because ―every case since Reid that . . . applied the 
test . . . found the hired party to be an independent contractor where 
the hiring party failed to extend benefits or pay social security tax-
es.‖258 In determining which Reid factors were deserving of more 
weight, the Aymes court did not simply pull these five factors out of 
thin air. Instead it relied on all of the cases decided in the interven-
ing three and a half years since Reid—six cases in total.259 
 With respect to the remaining Reid factors, the Aymes court indi-
cated that some were generally of little use in the work made for hire 
analysis.260 In particular, the court noted that whether the work is part 
of the regular business of the hiring party and whether the hiring par-
ty is in business will generally have little weight in the analysis.261  
III.   UPDATING AYMES—A COMPREHENSIVE MULTIFACTOR STUDY 
 The pronouncement of the important factors in Aymes took place a 
mere three years after Reid. Since Aymes, many more work made for 
hire cases have been decided. Accordingly, a fresh and more compre-
hensive look at courts‘ analyses of the Reid factors will facilitate a 
greater understanding of which factors are the most important in de-
termining whether a hired party is an employee or independent con-
tractor. This study examines the universe of work made for hire cases 
since Reid where a determination of the hired party‘s status has been 
made and evaluates which factors are and are not important in the 
analysis. This part sets forth the methodology for locating and coding 
the cases. Next, it describes the results of this study and clusters the 
factors based on their importance. 
                                                                                                                                       
the other factors relevant to this inquiry are [the Reid factors].‖ Reid, 490 U.S. at 751. 
Nonetheless, many lower courts have treated this as one of the Reid factors. See, e.g., Hi-Tech 
Video Prods., Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 58 F.3d 1093, 1097 (6th Cir. 1995); Blair v. 
World Tropics Prods., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834 (W.D. Ark. 2007); Alcatel USA, Inc. v. 
Cisco Sys., Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 645, 652-54 (E.D. Tex. 2002); Aerospace Servs. Int‘l v. LPA 
Grp. Inc., No. Civ.A.1:90–CV–2605–J, 1992 WL 12000194, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 1992). 
 257. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861.  
 258. Id. at 863. 
 259. Id. at 860-63. 
 260. Id. at 863-64. 
 261. Id. at 863 (―[T]his factor will generally be of little help in this analysis.‖). 
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A.   Methodology 
 Using a broad search, I located what I believe to be all of the work 
made for hire cases decided under the 1976 Copyright Act from June 
5, 1989 through June 5, 2014.262 After eliminating false positives,263 
this search yielded forty-six work made for hire cases.264 For each 
case, the following information was recorded: whether the court con-
cluded the hired party was an employee or independent contractor, the 
identity of the court and which circuit it fell within, the year the case 
was decided, and whether the case cited Aymes in the context of the 
five factors the Aymes court found to almost always be important.265 
 In addition, for each case two variables were created for each Reid 
factor. The first variable was whether the factor favored employee 
status, favored independent contractor status, was indeterminate, or 
was not addressed by the court. These determinations were made 
based on statements by the courts about how these factors affected 
the outcome.  
 The second variable was whether the court weighted each Reid 
factor. The coding options for this variable were that the court gave 
                                                                                                                                       
 262. I ran the following search in the ALLCASES database in Westlaw, which contains 
all federal and state court cases: employee /p (―work for hire‖ ―work made for hire‖) /p fac-
tor!. I then limited the search results to the date range between June 5, 1989 and June 5, 
2014. This yielded 109 cases. Of these 109 cases, 43 analyzed the Reid factors and deter-
mined whether the hired party was an employee or independent contractor. I then ran this 
search in Lexis: employee /para (―work for hire‖ or ―work made for hire‖) /para factor!. I 
then limited the search results to the date range between June 5, 1989 and June 5, 2014. 
The Lexis search produced an additional eighteen cases that were not already captured in 
the Westlaw search. Only two of these eighteen cases produced a copyright case that ana-
lyzed the Reid factors and determined whether the hired party was an employee or inde-
pendent contractor. I then ran this search in Bloomberg Law: employee p/ (―work made for 
hire‖ OR ―work for hire‖) p/ factor!. I then limited the search results to the date range be-
tween June 5, 1989 and June 5, 2014. The Bloomberg search produced an additional five 
cases not already captured in the Westlaw and Lexis searches. Only one of these five cases 
produced copyright cases that analyzed the Reid factors and determined whether the hired 
parties were employees or independent contractors. I recognize that there might be other 
work made for hire cases that have been decided, but were not reported in Westlaw, Lexis, 
or Bloomberg. See generally Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, passim (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author) (describing the concept of submerged prece-
dent); Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Clarity and Clarification: Grable Federal Questions in the 
Eyes of Their Beholders, 91 NEB. L. REV. 387, 427-30 (2012) (same). Given the limited 
search capabilities of docket management systems, it is cost-prohibitive to do any more of 
an exhaustive search. 
 263. The false positives were mostly non-copyright cases (e.g. Title VII) or copyright 
cases where the court did not decide whether the hired party was an employee or inde-
pendent contractor (e.g. denying a motion for summary judgment because there was a gen-
uine issue of material fact regarding the analysis).  
 264. In one case, Huebbe v. Oklahoma Casting Co., 663 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (W.D. Okla. 
2009), the District Court engaged in two separate work made for hire analyses. Because 
these analyses were distinct, I treated them as two cases. This explains why although 
there were forty-five cases in the search, I analyzed forty-six cases as part of this study. 
 265. Aymes itself was also included in this last variable. 
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additional weight to the particular factor, discounted the factor, or 
did not expressly weight the factor.266 These too were based on state-
ments (or the absence of statements) by the courts about how much 
weight they were giving each of the factors. 
 In addition to the twelve Reid factors, two factors that were ad-
dressed with some frequency were added: (1) the hiring party‘s right 
to control the manner and means by which the product is accom-
plished,267 and (2) how the hired party and hiring party referred to 
the hired party. Finally, because the Reid factors are not an exhaus-
tive list, any additional factors the courts discussed in their analyses 
were recorded. All of the additional factors were coded the same as 
the two variables used for the Reid factors.268 
B.   Results 
 Using this data, the following calculations were made: how fre-
quently each factor was addressed by the courts, how consistent each 
factor was with the ultimate result about the status of the hired party, 
and how frequently each factor was given additional weight or dis-
counted in the courts‘ analyses. These calculations are shown below in  
Table 1 as Frequency,269 Consistency,270 Favored Weighting,271 and 
Discounted Weighting,272 respectively.  
                                                                                                                                       
 266. The weighting or discounting of the factors could be done either by the court stat-
ing that the factor generally was entitled to additional weight or should generally be dis-
counted (i.e. the court stating that in its circuit, the following factors are important) or 
during the application of the factor to the facts of the particular case (i.e. the court not 
making a pronouncement about the factors‘ importance in the abstract, but stating that a 
particular factor was particularly important during the analysis of the facts before it). 
 267. See supra note 256. 
 268. My research assistant and I independently coded all of the variables and then met 
in person to resolve any conflicts in the coding by reviewing the case. 
 269. Frequency for each factor is calculated as forty-six total cases minus the number 
of cases the factor was not addressed by the courts. 
 270. Consistency for each factor is calculated by adding together the total number of 
cases where the factor‘s outcome is consistent with the court‘s ultimate conclusion about 
the hired party‘s status. For example, if the skill required factor favors a finding of employ-
ee status and the court ultimately concludes the hired party is an employee, then this is 
consistent. If, however, the court finds that the skill required factor favors a finding of 
employee status, but the court ultimately concludes the hired party is an independent con-
tractor, then this is inconsistent. The percentage in parentheses is calculated by dividing 
this number by the number in the Frequency column. In other words, when the factor is 
addressed, how consistent is it with the ultimate conclusion? 
 271. Favored Weighting for each factor is calculated by adding together the total num-
ber of cases where the factor is given additional weight. The percentage in parentheses is 
calculated by dividing this number by the number in the Frequency column. In other 
words, when this factor is addressed, how often is it favored? 
 272. Discounted Weighting for each factor is calculated the same way Favored Weighting 
is, but counts cases where the factor is discounted rather than given additional weight. 
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 These calculations all measure, in some form, the importance of 
the factors. The frequency with which a factor is analyzed suggests 
whether courts are considering the factor in the first place or simply 
ignoring it. A frequently ignored factor is less likely to be important 
than one frequently addressed. Likewise, consistency illustrates im-
portance, because a factor that is less reliable in predicting the ulti-
mate outcome suggests that courts treat that factor as having less 
impact on the ultimate result than other factors.273 Finally, whether a 
factor is discounted or given additional weight in the analysis reflects 
its importance as the courts are directly addressing which factors 
they take more seriously and find more probative in the analysis and 
which factors they routinely declare to be of less importance. 
 
Table 1 – Summary Table 
Factor Frequency Consistency 
Favored 
Weighting 
Discounted 
Weighting 
Skill required 26 (57%) 22 (85%) 8 (31%) 1 (4%) 
Source of  
instrumentalities 
and tools 33 (72%) 29 (88%) 2 (6%) 1 (3%) 
Work location 32 (70%) 24 (75%) 0 (0%) 4 (13%) 
Relationship  
duration 29 (63%) 23 (79%) 1 (3%) 2 (7%) 
Additional projects 29 (63%) 25 (86%) 6 (20%) 1 (3%) 
When and how long 
to work 32 (70%) 26 (81%) 0 (0%) 2 (6%) 
Payment method 39 (85%) 33 (85%) 5 (13%) 0 (0%) 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 18 (39%) 13 (72%) 0 (0%) 2 (11%) 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 29 (63%) 24 (83%) 0 (0%) 4 (14%) 
Hiring party in 
business 9 (20%) 4 (44%) 0 (0%) 3 (33%) 
Employee benefits 36 (78%) 32 (89%) 12 (33%) 2 (6%) 
Tax treatment 37 (80%) 32 (86%) 12 (32%) 2 (5%) 
Right to control 
manner and means 36 (78%) 21 (58%) 5 (14%) 4 (11%) 
Label 9 (20%) 5 (56%) 1 (11%) 3 (33%) 
 
 Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 show how each factor fares with respect to 
each of the four calculations. As illustrated in those tables, some fac-
tors tend to rise toward the top of the list regardless of which calcula-
                                                                                                                                       
 273. Inconsistent factors are also less useful to the parties and attorneys in predict-
ing outcomes. 
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tion is used.274 Other factors are stable in the middle275 or at the bot-
tom276 of the list. But there is some fluctuation of the factors‘ rank-
ings across calculations.277 
 
Table 2 – Sorted by Frequency (%) 
Factor Frequency 
Payment method 39 (85%) 
Tax treatment 37 (80%) 
Employee benefits 36 (78%) 
Right to control manner and means 36 (78%) 
Source of instrumentalities and tools 33 (72%) 
Work location 32 (70%) 
When and how long to work 32 (70%) 
Relationship duration 29 (63%) 
Additional projects 29 (63%) 
Part of regular business of hiring party 29 (63%) 
Skill required 26 (57%) 
Hiring and paying assistants 18 (39%) 
Hiring party in business 9 (20%) 
Label 9 (20%) 
 
Table 3 – Sorted by Consistency (%) 
Factor Consistency 
Employee benefits 32 (89%) 
Source of instrumentalities and tools 29 (88%) 
Additional projects 25 (86%) 
Tax treatment 32 (86%) 
Skill required 22 (85%) 
Payment method 33 (85%) 
Part of regular business of hiring party 24 (83%) 
When and how long to work 26 (81%) 
Relationship duration 23 (79%) 
Work location 24 (75%) 
Hiring and paying assistants 13 (72%) 
Right to control manner and means 21 (58%) 
Label 5 (56%) 
Hiring party in business 4 (44%) 
                                                                                                                                       
 274. For example, payment method, employee benefits, and tax treatment are in the 
top half for each calculation. 
 275. For example, relationship duration is ranked eighth, ninth, ninth, and eighth in 
Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. 
 276. For example, whether the hiring party is in business is ranked last in every 
calculation. 
 277. For example, payment method is ranked first when sorted by frequency and dis-
counted weighting, but is only sixth for consistency and favored weighting. 
228  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Vol. 42:197 
 
 With respect to weighting factors, it is worth noting that other 
than giving additional weight to employee benefits, tax treatment, 
skill required, and arguably the right to assign additional projects, 
courts do very little favorable weighting.278 Discounted weighting is 
even rarer. Although the hiring party being in business and the label 
used to describe the hired party are discounted thirty-three percent 
of the time, in terms of raw numbers, this discounting occurred in 
only three cases for each measure.279 
 
Table 4 – Sorted by Favored Weighting (%) 
Factor Favored Weighting 
Employee benefits 12 (33%) 
Tax treatment 12 (32%) 
Skill required 8 (31%) 
Additional projects 6 (20%) 
Right to control manner and means 5 (14%) 
Payment method 5 (13%) 
Label 1 (11%) 
Source of instrumentalities and tools 2 (6%) 
Relationship duration 1 (3%) 
Work location 0 (0%) 
When and how long to work 0 (0%) 
Hiring and paying assistants 0 (0%) 
Part of regular business of hiring party 0 (0%) 
Hiring party in business 0 (0%) 
 
Table 5 – Sorted by Discounted Weighting (%) 
Factor 
Discounted 
Weighting 
Payment method 0 (0%) 
Source of instrumentalities and tools 1 (3%) 
Additional projects 1 (3%) 
Skill required 1 (4%) 
Tax treatment 2 (5%) 
When and how long to work 2 (6%) 
Employee benefits 2 (6%) 
Relationship duration 2 (7%) 
Hiring and paying assistants 2 (11%) 
Right to control manner and means 4 (11%) 
Work location 4 (13%) 
Part of regular business of hiring party 4 (14%) 
Hiring party in business 3 (33%) 
Label 3 (33%) 
                                                                                                                                       
 278. See Table 4. 
 279. See Table 5. 
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 Although each calculation by itself is helpful in understanding the 
importance of a particular factor in the work made for hire analysis, 
no single calculation can tell the entire story. For example, if we only 
looked at the frequency with which the factors are addressed, then 
we might conclude that the skill required is one of the least im-
portant of the Reid factors.280 But although frequency tells us how 
often the courts address the factor, it could be that, when they do ad-
dress it, they give it additional weight in the analysis, because the 
courts consider it to be important in the inquiry. The skill required 
factor falls into this category as it is weighted favorably 31% of the 
time. As described earlier, looking only at the weighting calculations 
is also of limited use because of the small number of cases where 
weight is discussed.281 As a result, all of the calculations must be ex-
amined together to discover which factors are the most and least im-
portant. Based on all four calculations in Table 1, I propose that the 
continuum shown in Figure 1 describes the relative importance of the 
work made for hire factors. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 This continuum groups together factors that share similar fea-
tures with respect to each of the calculations. For example, the fac-
tors listed as the most important (tax treatment, employee benefits, 
and payment method) all have high consistency (85%–89%), are ad-
dressed very frequently (78%–85%), are often or sometimes favorably 
weighted (13%–33%), and are never or infrequently discounted (0%–
6%). The next group of factors (additional projects, skill required, and 
source of the instrumentalities and tools) all have a high consistency 
(85%–88%) but have a lower frequency (57%–72%); they do, however, 
have significant weighting (6%–31% favorable; 3%–4% discounting). 
Because this group is similar in many respects to the ―most im-
                                                                                                                                       
 280. Skill required is ranked eleventh in Table 2. 
 281. See supra text accompanying notes 278-79. 
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portant‖ group, but is addressed with less frequency, these factors 
are grouped together and deemed slightly less important. 
 At the other end of the continuum are the least important factors. 
These factors (right to control the manner and means, the label used 
to describe the hired party, and whether the hiring party is in busi-
ness) have very poor consistency (44%–58%). And although the right 
to control the manner and means factor is addressed with high fre-
quency (78%), this means very little given how inconsistent it is 
(58%) and that courts also split on whether it receives favorable 
weighting (14%) or is discounted (11%). The other two factors in this 
group are rarely addressed (20%) and are the most likely to be dis-
counted in the analyses (33%). 
 Whether a particular factor belongs in one group down or one 
group up is certainly debatable; reasonable minds can differ. Illus-
trating the importance of the factors using a continuum with fuzzy 
lines separating the groups rather than strict lines of demarcation 
between the groups was purposefully chosen to acknowledge this. 
 To test how useful these groups are at predicting the ultimate out-
come in a case, the top three factors were analyzed. If a majority of 
the three factors that were addressed favored the ultimate outcome, 
this was considered a successful prediction. If only two of the three 
factors were addressed and they were split, this was considered an 
unsuccessful prediction. Using only the three most important factors 
(tax treatment, employee benefits, and payment method), eighty-
seven percent of the cases would be decided consistent with courts‘ 
ultimate conclusion. When this study was done using the most im-
portant two groups, ninety-one percent of the cases would be decided 
consistent with the courts‘ ultimate conclusion. In contrast, doing the 
same analysis using the three least important factors yielded a forty-
eight percent success rate. Expanding this to the five least important 
factors improved the success rate to sixty-three percent. Doing the 
same analysis for the middle three factors yielded a seventy-eight 
percent success rate. These results are displayed below in Figure 2. 
In sum, the structure of this continuum appears to correctly illus-
trate the relative importance of the Reid and other commonly-
considered factors.282 
                                                                                                                                       
 282. There are, of course, limitations on this study. The primary limitation is the small 
number of cases (n=46) involved in the study. Because of this relatively small number of 
cases, it makes it nearly impossible to make the data any more granular. For example, it 
might be interesting to see if the factors‘ importance changes based on the type of industry 
or work at issue. Although there are some industries or works that occur with some fre-
quency (e.g. architecture and software), there are not enough of these cases to be able to 
draw any meaningful conclusions. Another limitation of this study is the potential for se-
lection bias. That is, the parties or their attorneys deciding which case to bring and not 
bring based on how the courts addressed the factors in previous decisions. This issue exists 
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Figure 2 
 
IV.   DISCUSSION 
 The results of this study lead to two broad questions. First, how do 
these results fit within the long and varied developments of the work 
made for hire doctrine? Second, going forward, what are the implica-
tions of these results? This part explores each of these questions.  
 With respect to reflecting on the results in light of the historical 
developments, this part discusses how these results square with the 
Second Circuit‘s statement in Aymes about the importance and lack 
of importance of specific factors.283 In addition, it examines whether 
and how these results cohere with the pre-Reid interpretations of 
―employee‖ and the Supreme Court‘s rationales for adopting and re-
jecting these interpretations.284 
 With respect to the implications of these results, this part first 
explores how these results may affect general copyright litigation 
where the parties contest the work made for hire status of a work.285 
Afterwards, these results are situated within the context of the im-
pending litigation concerning the work made for hire status of music 
recorded after 1977.286 Finally, this part suggests how these results 
                                                                                                                                       
with any study based on reported cases, but the effect could be more pronounced in this 
situation given the small number of cases. 
 283. See infra Part IV.A. 
 284. See infra Part IV.A. 
 285. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 286. See infra Part IV.B.2.  
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may be of use to business planning attorneys so they can effectively 
advise their clients to achieve their desired results.287 
A.   Doctrinal Fit 
 In Aymes, the Second Circuit concluded that the following factors 
were the most important in the multifactor analysis: 
(1) the hiring party‘s right to control the manner and means of crea-
tion; (2) the skill required; (3) the provision of employee benefits; 
(4) the tax treatment of the hired party; and (5) whether the hiring 
party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party.288 
Of the five Aymes factors, four are within the top two groups of the 
continuum.289 The only Aymes factor not in these top two groups is 
the hiring party‘s right to control the manner and means of creation. 
This factor is surprisingly within the least important group of the 
continuum. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court in Reid suggested 
this was not itself a factor but was the ultimate question to be an-
swered using the listed factors.290 Despite this, many lower courts 
have deemed the right to control a factor, rather than the ultimate 
conclusion.291 The lack of importance of this factor is surprising given 
that it is supposed to be determined by the other factors.292 Given 
that two courts (the Supreme Court and Second Circuit) have bol-
stered the importance of this factor, it is worth emphasizing that oth-
er courts have, by and large, ignored this authority. 
 In addition to overemphasizing the importance of the right to con-
trol factor, the Aymes court underappreciated the importance of the 
method of payment factor. The court acknowledged that this could be 
a ―fairly important factor,‖293 but as illustrated above, this factor 
turns out to be one of the three most important factors. To a lesser 
extent, the source of the instrumentalities was underappreciated by 
Aymes, which is within the same group as the skill required factor. 
                                                                                                                                       
 287. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 288. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992).  
 289. Employee benefits and tax treatment are in the most important group. The skill 
required and right to assign additional projects are in the second most important group. 
 290. See supra note 256. 
 291. Id. 
 292. In theory, the lack of importance of the right to control factor could make sense 
given the way the Supreme Court and Restatement (Second) of Agency have phrased the 
test as the ultimate question. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 
750-51 (1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§220, 228 cmt. c (1958). In other 
words, if the lower courts interpreted Reid this way, then it would not be an important 
factor, because it is not really a factor at all. However, this explanation is not warranted 
given that the lower courts have frequently treated the right to control as a factor (seventy-
eight percent frequency). See supra Table 1. Ultimately, this factor is not consistent with 
the outcomes and is treated inconsistently by the courts with respect to the weighting. 
 293. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863. 
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 In addition to declaring which factors were the most important, 
the Aymes court also opined that whether the work is part of the reg-
ular business of the hiring party and whether the hiring party is in 
business were of little use in the analysis.294 Based on the results of 
this study, it turns out that Aymes was certainly correct with respect 
to whether the hiring party is in business, because this factor is in 
the least important group. However, being part of the regular busi-
ness of the hiring party is not as inconsequential as Aymes made it 
out to be. Although not one of the most important factors, this factor 
is in the middle of the pack. 
 In sum, the statements in Aymes about the importance or lack of 
importance of specific factors are largely, but not completely, con-
sistent with the results of this study. Of course, this could be at-
tributed to path dependency. That is, the courts were bound to follow 
or were heavily influenced by Aymes. Of the forty-six cases, thirty-six 
postdated Aymes. Of those thirty-six cases, eight (twenty-two per-
cent) cite to Aymes, or a case citing Aymes, for the proposition that 
the Aymes factors are the important ones.295 Although path depend-
ency probably had some influence on the ultimate outcome of the im-
portance of the factors, the variations between the results of this 
study and the conclusions in Aymes suggest that path dependency 
was not dispositive in determining importance. 
 With respect to the results of this study as they relate to the pre-
Reid tests for distinguishing employees from independent contrac-
tors, two observations are in order. First, as described earlier, alt-
hough the Supreme Court cast the rejected right to control test as 
focusing on controlling the product as opposed to controlling the 
manner and means of production,296 it is questionable whether there 
is a meaningful difference between them.297 Nonetheless, the right to 
control test, as adopted by the lower courts before Reid, focused on 
the right to control the manner and means in which the hired party 
worked.298 Even assuming the Supreme Court had correctly under-
stood the right to control test, the results of this study suggest that 
the right to control is unimportant. This factor is in the least im-
portant group on the continuum. As a result, the Supreme Court‘s 
rejection of the right to control test is consistent with the results of 
this study. However, because the Supreme Court misunderstood the 
                                                                                                                                       
 294. Id.  
 295. Of course, courts that reached a similar conclusion with respect to how they bal-
anced the factors could have read Aymes but failed to cite to the opinion. 
 296. See supra notes 246-49 and accompanying text.  
 297. See supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
 298. See, e.g., Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
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test, the reason for the consistency has little to do with the Court‘s 
rationale for rejecting the test.299 
 Second, when comparing the formal, salaried employee test with 
the results of this study, we see that the Dumas factors tend to line 
up fairly-well with the most important factors on the continuum. Of 
the eight Dumas factors, six are also found in Reid.300 Like Aymes, 
the Dumas factors account for four of the top six factors. But unlike 
Aymes, the Dumas factors account for all three of the most important 
factors. The other two Dumas factors that are found in Reid—
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party 
and location of the work—fall in the middle or lower end of the con-
tinuum, but not the lowest group as occurred with the Aymes factors. 
Moreover, one of the Dumas factors not listed in Reid—working for 
several hiring parties or exclusively for one—was addressed in four 
cases as an additional factor. This was the most common ―other‖ fac-
tor and although not weighted favorably or discounted, it was 100% 
consistent with the ultimate outcomes in the cases. Given these re-
sults, it may be that courts are actually using a variation of the Du-
mas formal, salaried employee test. This comports with Professor 
Hardy‘s view that the formal, salaried employee test is the appropri-
ate one.301 Recall that Professor Hardy argued that the stakeholders 
assumed this was the test when they negotiated the terms of the 
1976 Act in light of the 1909 Act, which seemed to recognize hiring 
party ownership of works created by salaried employees.302 The fac-
tors at the important end of the continuum support the view that a 
variation of the formal, salaried employee test is what the courts are 
actually using in arriving at their conclusions. This is an interesting 
result in light of how harshly the Supreme Court treated the formal, 
salaried employee test in Reid.303 The importance of these factors also 
                                                                                                                                       
 299. Interestingly, the Restatement (Third) of Agency, published in 2006, defines em-
ployee as ―an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and 
means of the agent‘s performance of work.‖ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 
(2006). The factors from the Restatement (Second) of Agency have been relegated to the 
comments of section 7.07. Id. at § 7.07 cmt. f. No court has suggested reviving the right to 
control test in light of this change in the Restatement. 
 300. These factors include: (1) whether the hired party worked in his or her own studio 
or on the premises of the hiring party; (2) whether the hiring party is in the regular busi-
ness of creating works of the type purchased; (3) whether the hiring party retains authority 
to assign additional projects to the hired party; (4) the tax treatment of the relationship by 
the parties; (5) whether the hired party is paid a salary or wages, or is paid a flat fee; and 
(6) whether the hired party obtains from the hiring party all benefits customarily extended to 
its regular employees. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989). 
 301. See supra notes 99, 105, and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra notes 99, 105, and accompanying text. 
 303. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 742 n.8 (noting that the statutory definition of work made 
for hire ―cannot support‖ the formal, salaried employee test, and acknowledging disagree-
ment about the exact contours of the test). This test was rejected in a footnote, unlike the 
2014]  WORK MADE FOR HIRE 235 
 
brings us back full circle to the legislative history of the 1909 Act, 
which focused on employees being salaried.304 
 One reason courts gravitate towards the three factors at the im-
portant end of the continuum could be that they are objectively 
measured and easy to apply. For example, whether the hiring party 
treated the hired party as an employee or independent contractor for 
tax purposes only involves looking at payroll documents and forms 
filed with the federal government. Likewise, providing benefits such as 
insurance is easily verified by looking at enrollment data. Similarly, 
the method of payment is easily determined by looking at paystubs to 
figure out the frequency and amounts paid. This is not to say that the 
other factors cannot be easily proven by looking at documents or other 
evidence, but factors such as skill required or the right to control the 
manner and means involve a certain level of subjectivity. 
 One final note about Reid and the results of this study is apposite. 
In justifying the agency test, the Supreme Court explained that 
―Congress‘ paramount goal in revising the 1976 Act [was] enhancing 
predictability and certainty of copyright ownership.‖305 Given the re-
sults of this study and the multitude of cases where summary judg-
ment is denied because of an issue of material fact about whether the 
hiring party is an employee or independent contractor, it is doubtful 
that the agency test has achieved this result.306 Under Reid, courts 
balance about a dozen factors, some of which are consistent with the 
ultimate conclusion and some of which have very little to do with the 
ultimate result. It is odd to imagine a multifactor balancing test such 
as the one set forth in Reid as providing more predictability and cer-
tainty to the parties than a smaller set of factors would achieve.307 If 
enhancing certainty and predictability of copyright ownership really 
were Congress‘ paramount goals in the 1976 Act, then perhaps the 
                                                                                                                                       
right to control and actual control tests, which were rejected in the main text of the  
opinion. Id. 
 304. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
 305. Reid, 490 U.S. at 749. 
 306. See, e.g., Int‘l Code Council, Inc. v. Nat‘l Fire Prot. Ass‘n, No. 02C5610, 2006 WL 
850879, at *23 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2006) (summary judgment is precluded because ―a rea-
sonable trier of facts could resolve the Reid multifactor analysis in either party‘s favor‖); 
Brower v. Martin, 446 F. Supp. 2d 232, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (―In light of these and other 
disputed questions of material fact, the court cannot conclude as a matter of law whether 
plaintiff‘s songs constitute works-for-hire or to whom the copyright in these songs be-
longs.‖); Ulloa v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 2d 409, 416 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (―Having examined the Reid–Aymes factors and drawn all inferences in 
favor of the Plaintiff, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that either the musical 
composition or the sound recording of the Vocal Phrase were created as works for hire.‖). 
 307. In the consumer context, we see that having too much choice or too many options 
can lead to bad results. See generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE – WHY 
MORE IS LESS passim (2004). Perhaps courts suffer from a similar version of analysis pa-
ralysis in that they either fail to resolve the issue themselves, and instead let juries decide, 
or latch onto a subset of factors and fail to engage in a complete multifactor analysis. 
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Supreme Court should reconsider the Reid test and adopt a subset of 
factors for the courts to consider. One option would be to only use the 
factors in the most important and second most important groups of 
the continuum. Another option would be to use the factors from the 
top two groups, but if those factors are evenly split, then turn to the 
less important factors as tie-breakers. In the event Congress has the 
opportunity to revisit the work made for hire doctrine and believes 
predictability and certainty are still valuable goals vis à vis copyright 
ownership, then perhaps Congress could provide more guidance as to 
what constitutes an employer-employee relationship by recognizing 
these factors as existing in tiers. Neither is likely, but given the lack 
of guidance from the Supreme Court on how to balance the factors, 
lower courts have the flexibility to adopt a formal recognition of the 
important and unimportant factors as suggested by the continuum 
presented here. 
B.   Practical Implications 
 Although the fit between the results of this study and the underly-
ing doctrine and historical developments is intriguing, these results 
may also be of great value to litigators and business planning attor-
neys in the field. Where the parties dispute the work made for hire 
status of a copyright, these results will help litigators to gather and 
present evidence concerning the doctrine and to better evaluate their 
cases.308 One such instance, explored in more depth below, is the up-
coming litigation between artists, producers, and record companies in 
regard to songs recorded after 1977.309 In the context of business 
planning, these results will help attorneys structure their clients‘ re-
lationships to help achieve the desired employment status.310 Each is 
discussed in detail below. 
 1.   General Work Made for Hire Litigation 
 Litigation involving employment status under the work made for 
hire doctrine can arise in a few situations. For example, a defendant 
may assert that the plaintiff has no right to assert a claim for copy-
right infringement, because the plaintiff is not the legal or beneficial 
owner of the copyright as a result of the work being a work made for 
hire.311 Another example is a copyright infringement dispute between 
the hiring and hired parties where the alleged infringer successfully 
defends by claiming ownership of the copyright via the work made for 
                                                                                                                                       
 308. See infra Part IV.B.1.  
 309. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 310. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 311. Only the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right is entitled to institute an 
action for copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2012). 
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hire doctrine.312 Another instance could be determining whether art-
ists are entitled to assert violations of their moral rights under the 
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, which does not provide moral 
rights to works made for hire.313 Finally, the employment status in 
the work made for hire doctrine may arise in situations involving 
terminations of transfers, which also do not apply to works made for 
hire.314 In these situations, determining whether a party is an em-
ployee or independent contractor may entirely or partially dispose of 
a case or significantly shift negotiating power when trying to settle a 
dispute. 
 Armed with the results of this study, litigators engaged in discov-
ery can focus their energy and clients‘ money on the factors at the 
most important end of the continuum and pay less attention to those 
at the least important end. After completing discovery, the attorneys 
can use the continuum to decide how to present their arguments in 
favor of and against a work made for hire conclusion. For example, in 
a motion for summary judgment, rather than simply analyzing the 
factors in the order presented in Reid, it may be more persuasive to 
analyze the factors in the order of importance. If most of the factors 
at the important end of the continuum support the movant, then pre-
senting them this way may cause the judge to grant the motion.315 
Likewise, if the factors at the more important end are split, the non-
movant may want to present the factors like this to avoid summary 
judgment. In addition to gathering and presenting evidence of em-
ployment status, these results should assist attorneys in evaluating 
their clients‘ cases and giving more informed recommendations about 
whether to settle a dispute and for how much.316 In short, focusing on 
                                                                                                                                       
 312. See, e.g., Maness v. Heavrin, 97 F.3d 1457, 1457 (8th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table 
decision). The reason this situation arises is because one cannot infringe a copyright they 
own. Richmond v. Weiner, 353 F.2d 41, 42 (9th Cir. 1965) (―[A] copyright owner cannot 
infringe against his own copyright.‖). 
 313. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2)(B) (defining ―work of visual art‖ as not including a work made 
for hire). 
 314. Id. § 203(a) (―In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, [certain 
granted rights are] subject to termination . . . .‖). For a more detailed analysis on termina-
tion rights, see infra Part IV.B.2. 
 315. This is not to say that simply reordering the factors will cause a change in out-
come in most cases. In fact, considering how to present the factors may only be useful in 
borderline cases where a court is on the fence about granting or denying a motion for 
summary judgment. 
 316. It is unclear if the parties would settle even if they knew this information. Looking 
at the 46 cases involved in this study, in 22 (48%) of them, 100% of the factors that were 
addressed and not indeterminate were consistent with the ultimate outcome in the case 
(e.g. if 9 factors were addressed, the court held all nine weighed in favor of the outcome). In 
10 of the cases (22% of the total), only one factor was inconsistent with the ultimate conclu-
sion. Combined, 70% of the cases involved a situation where 0 or 1 factor was inconsistent 
with the ultimate outcome. Once the attorneys in these cases knew what the facts were, it 
is hard to understand why the attorneys for the eventually-losing parties would push 
ahead with this aspect of the litigation. 
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the most important factors can provide the increased predictability 
and certainty that the Court in Reid thought it was providing. 
2.   Specific Work Made for Hire Litigation—Terminations of 
Transfers and Sound Recordings 
 One of the most interesting areas of copyright law where the work 
made for hire status will arise is with respect to terminations of 
transfers in sound recordings. Section 203 of the Copyright Act per-
mits termination right owners to end certain post-1977 transfers of a 
copyright and reclaim the copyright for themselves.317 That is, if the 
work and type of transfer are eligible for termination and the termina-
tion right is exercised, all the rights covered by the transfer revert 
back to the owner of the termination interest.318 As a result, the termi-
nation right holder gets ―a second bite at the apple‖ and can attempt to 
negotiate a new license or assignment on more favorable terms.319 
 For example, imagine an unknown artist records a song at her 
home studio and in 2014 successfully sells her copyright in the sound 
recording to a record company for a measly sum. The recording turns 
out to be a huge success, and the record company earns millions of 
dollars from exploiting its acquired rights in the recording. Under 
section 203, after thirty-five years, the recording artist could reclaim 
the copyright in the sound recording. If the record company wanted 
to continue exploiting the recording, it would be forced to sit down at 
the negotiating table with the recording artist and reach a new deal. 
Presumably, the recording artist will negotiate a better deal in 2049 
than she did in 2014. 
 As illustrated by this example, the termination of transfer right is 
a powerful one. As it turns out, 2013 was the first year of termina-
tions under section 203320 and a wave of termination disputes is ex-
pected over the next several years.321 These disputes (and the inevi-
                                                                                                                                       
 317. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012). 
 318. Id. § 203(b). 
 319. Corey Field, Their Master’s Voice? Recording Artists, Bright Lines, and Bowie 
Bonds: The Debate Over Sound Recordings as Works Made For Hire, 48 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC‘Y U.S.A. 145, 155 (2000). Sections 304(c) and (d) of the Copyright Act are additional 
termination of transfers provisions, but apply to copyrights transferred before 1978. 17 
U.S.C. § 304(c), (d). Like section 203, these sections also exclude works made for hire from 
termination. But because the works were created before 1978, the 1909 Copyright Act‘s 
work made for hire doctrine applies rather than the modern doctrine. 
 320. Section 203 applies to transfers made on or after January 1, 1978. § 203(a). The five-
year termination window begins thirty-five years after execution of the transfer. Therefore, 
the earliest five-year window could have begun on January 1, 2013. See § 203(a)(3). 
 321. See Brian Day, In Defense of Copyright: Record Labels, Creativity, and the Future 
of Music, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 61, 71 (2011); William Henslee & Elizabeth 
Henslee, You Don’t Own Me: Why Work for Hire Should Not Be Applied to Sound Record-
ings, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 695, 704 (2011). 
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table litigation accompanying them) will turn, in part, on the out-
come of the work made for hire analysis and what it means to be an 
employee versus an independent contractor, because termination of 
transfer rights do not exist for works made for hire.322 Instead, an 
employer whose employee created a copyrightable work will be the 
author and can enjoy the copyright for the duration without the fear 
of losing the copyright thirty-five to forty years later. To be sure, 
terminations of transfers under section 203 apply to all types of copy-
rightable works. But the looming litigation involving terminations of 
transfers of sound recordings is a good case study for analyzing how 
the Reid factors should be analyzed and what the likely outcome is in 
light of the factors‘ relative importance.  
 To appreciate the work made for hire analysis of sound recordings, 
it is necessary to understand what sound recordings are and the po-
tential authors laying claim to those copyrights. Sound recordings 
are ―works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, 
or other sounds . . . regardless of the nature of the material ob-
jects . . . in which they are embodied.‖323 Sound recordings are to be 
distinguished from musical works, which are the underlying composi-
tion and lyrics.324 An artist who sings and records a song written by 
someone else has created a copyrightable sound recording but has no 
copyright interest in the underlying composition.325 
 There are three major players in the sound recording industry 
who are likely to make a claim as being an author of a particular 
sound recording. First are the recording artists themselves. The art-
ists are the individuals in the recording studio and creating the 
sounds by playing the instruments and singing the lyrics. Artists 
could be solo artists such as Billy Joel and Madonna or groups like 
Aerosmith and Bon Jovi. The House Report accompanying the Sound 
Recording Act of 1971326 suggests that recording artists can be au-
thors of sound recordings.327 The Copyright Office does the same.328 
                                                                                                                                       
 322. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (―In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, 
[a transfer of rights] is subject to termination . . . .‖ (emphasis added)). 
 323. Id. § 101 (defining ―sound recordings‖). 
 324. See Jessica L. Bagdanov, Comment, Internet Radio Disparity: The Need for Great-
er Equity in the Copyright Royalty Payment Structure, 14 CHAP. L. REV. 135, 139 (2010). 
 325. See Brian Day, Note, The Super Brawl: The History and Future of the Sound Re-
cording Performance Right, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 179, 182-83 (2009). 
 326. The legislation in the Sound Recording Act of 1971 gave federal copyright protec-
tion to sound recordings. Before then, the only protection afforded was state common law 
copyright protection. Daniel Gould, Time’s Up: Copyright Termination, Work-For-Hire and 
the Recording Industry, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 91, 97-98 (2007). 
 327. H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 5 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1569. 
 328. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 56, Copyright Registration for Sound Record-
ings 1 (2014), available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ56.pdf. 
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 Second are the producers. Producers come in all forms, but many 
of the most successful are those who are the driving force behind the 
recording; they are the ones with a vision of the recording and or-
chestrate everything from the lead vocals to instrumental solos to 
background vocals.329 Producers bring their experience with songwrit-
ing and arranging, musical performance, and recording to the table 
along with their musical philosophy, knowledge of the music busi-
ness, and rapport with artists to create the sound eventually heard 
by the public.330 Just as with recording artists, the House Report and 
Copyright Office suggest that producers may have a claim to author-
ship of sound recordings.331 
 Third are the record companies. The role of the record company 
has changed over time. Initially, the record companies exercised a 
great deal of control over the creative process.332 But beginning in the 
1970s, record companies narrowed their focus to manufacturing and 
promoting the sale of records.333 Nonetheless, record companies have 
not really abdicated all control over the creation of sound record-
ings334 and have a strong interest in claiming these recordings as 
works made for hire.335 In fact, nearly all recording contracts between 
record companies, artists, and producers contain clauses stating that 
the sound recordings are works made for hire and are owned by the 
record companies.336 Unfortunately for the record companies, merely 
                                                                                                                                       
 329. RICHARD JAMES BURGESS, THE ART OF MUSIC PRODUCTION 60-61 (Oxford Univer-
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Time Bomb 1 n.4 (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also Gould, 
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 332. See Menell & Nimmer, supra note 330, at 1 (noting that before the 1960s, the A&R 
departments at the record companies ―nurtured the talent by locating, writing, and arrang-
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4th ed. 2008); Day, supra note 321, at 74-75 (describing record companies subsidizing mu-
sic video production, providing support for promotional tours, and incurring the promo-
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 334. See infra notes 401-14 and accompanying text. 
 335. Henslee & Henslee, supra note 321, at 697 (―Record companies prefer for sound 
recordings to be considered under the ‗work-made-for-hire‘ doctrine because it prevents this 
right of termination and recapture.‖). 
 336. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, THE MUSICIAN‘S BUSINESS & LEGAL GUIDE 390 (Mark 
Halloran ed., rev. 2d ed. 1996); KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 28, 72; 
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declaring a work to be a work made for hire does not necessarily 
make it so.337 This is because such statements are only relevant for 
specially commissioned works made for hire, not those falling under 
the employee within the scope of employment provision.338 
 As a result, an analysis of the Reid factors is necessary to deter-
mine whether artists and producers are employees of the record com-
panies or independent contractors and hence whether the sound re-
cordings are works made for hire.339 The remainder of this part ana-
lyzes the Reid factors in light of common practices in the music busi-
ness. Then, using the continuum of importance, this part determines 
whether artists and producers are likely to be deemed employees and 
provides an in-depth roadmap for litigants and judges to analyze this 
issue in the upcoming cases. That being said, a word of caution is in 
order. Like with most general rules, there are exceptions. Contracts 
and practices in the record industry are no different. Every recording 
contract is not the same and what may be a general practice might 
not apply in a particular case. 
 (a)   Group #1 
 Starting with the most important group of factors, the first factor 
to consider is the tax treatment. This factor likely weighs in favor of 
                                                                                                                                       
RICHARD SCHULENBERG, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY: AN INSIDER‘S VIEW 150 
(2005); Henslee & Henslee, supra note 321, at 697. 
 337. Mark H. Jaffe, Defusing the Time Bomb Once Again – Determining Authorship in 
a Sound Recording, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y U.S.A. 139, 151 (2006).  
 338. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining work made for hire). 
 339. This article does not address whether the sound recordings could be a work made 
for hire under section 101(2) of the definition, which provides this status to specially or-
dered or commissioned works falling into one of nine categories. This analysis has been 
done by several others and is beyond the scope of this article, which is limited to work 
made for hire under section 101(1). See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 75, 
at § 5.03[B][2][a][ii] (concluding that ―there is no armchair answer‖ to this question); Field, 
supra note 319, at 174-75 (noting that most scholars having indicated that sound record-
ings are not collective works or compilations); Gould, supra note 326, at 127-29 (concluding 
that sound recordings are ―poor candidate[s]‖ for collective works, but could satisfy the 
requirement if an album included many guest artists or consisted of a compilation of an 
artist‘s hits); Jaffe, supra note 337, at 166-69 (2006) (concluding that Congress likely ―did 
not intend for sound recordings to constitute a collective work[,]‖ but there is merit to the 
contrary argument); David Nimmer & Peter S. Menell, Sound Recordings, Works For Hire, 
and the Termination-of-Transfers Time Bomb, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y U.S.A. 387 (2001) 
(noting that it is ―rank speculation‖ that sound recordings routinely qualify as contribu-
tions to collective works and that the matter will remain in doubt until ―painstaking analy-
sis is performed‖). It is worth mentioning however that in 1999, Congress 
ed  § 101(2) to add sound recordings to the list of categories eligible for work made for hire 
status. This was done at the insistence of the Recording Industry Association of American 
and rushed through Congress as a ―technical amendment‖ to the Omnibus Communica-
tions Reform Act of 1999 without analysis or debate. Mary LaFrance, Authorship and Ter-
mination Rights in Sound Recordings, 75 S. CALIF. L. REV. 375, 375 (2002). Outrage ensued 
and Congress, with its tail between its legs, repealed the amendment in Work Made for 
Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000. Id. at 375-76. 
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artists and producers, because record companies ―rarely withhold in-
come taxes or contribute to social security . . . .‖340  
 The second factor is whether employee benefits are provided. This 
factor is a tossup with respect to artists, but it definitely weighs in 
favor of producers. As a general rule, record companies do not provide 
health insurance, dental insurance, or retirement funds.341 Nonethe-
less, the two major artist unions—AFTRA and AFM—provide health 
and retirement funds for their members.342 Although not directly 
providing these traditional benefits, record companies are required to 
contribute to these unions‘ health and retirement funds as part of 
their agreements with the unions.343 As a result, although not direct-
ly paying for employee benefits, the record companies are indirectly 
providing them to those who qualify. Similar agreements for the 
funding and provision of benefits do not exist for producers.344 In sum, 
record companies have a colorable argument that they provide benefits 
to artists, but not for producers. This factor could go either way with 
respect to artists, but it certainly weighs in favor of producers. 
 The last factor in this group is the method of payment. Although 
record companies have a little room to argue this factor weighs in 
their favor, it overwhelmingly favors artists and producers being 
treated as independent contractors. Artists and producers are com-
pensated identically in two ways—advances and royalties. Artists are 
also compensated in a way producers are not—union scale.345 Artists 
and producers receive advances as part of a recording fund or are 
given separate cash advances that are not tied to the recording 
fund.346 Under a recording fund arrangement, the artist or producer 
                                                                                                                                       
 340. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 203. 
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BUSINESS 91 (1999). 
 342. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 64 (―The AFTRA Health and Retire-
ment Funds provide medical coverage and retirement benefits for eligible AFTRA mem-
bers.‖); MCPHERSON, supra note 341; see BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 229; 
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 346. BURGESS, supra 329, at 171; KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 203; 
MCPHERSON, supra note 341, at 61. 
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pays for the recording costs and if any money remains at the close of 
production, the artist or producer keeps the rest.347 Any advances or 
recording funds are paid in installments with a percentage paid be-
fore commencement of the recording, and the remainder of the pay-
ments are paid at various benchmarks along the way and upon deliv-
ery and acceptance of the masters.348 Compensation via an advance 
suggests that artist and producers are independent contractors, as 
payment by the job, instead of by the hour, is indicative of an inde-
pendent contractor relationship.349  
 Artists and producers are also paid a royalty based on sales of the 
album.350 These royalties are not paid to the artist and producer until 
the record company has recouped its recording costs, including any 
advances paid to the artist and producer.351 Once recouped, record 
companies generally pay artists‘ and producers‘ royalties twice a 
year, although some do so quarterly and others annually.352 Like with 
advances, the payment of royalties is not like an hourly wage or fixed 
salary paid to employees at frequent intervals. The payments cover a 
several-month period and the amount varies depending on the suc-
cess of the album. As a result, this method of payment also favors 
artists and producers being classified as independent contractors. 
 Finally, artists may be compensated at union scale.353 For singers, 
as opposed to musicians, AFTRA provides minimum rates that art-
ists must be compensated at, even if the artists are entitled to royal-
ties.354 Union scale under AFTRA is calculated as the greater of a per-
hour amount or per-side (per song) amount.355 However, it should be 
noted that these payments are capped at three times the minimum 
scale per side.356 With respect to payment of artists at union scale as 
calculated by the hour, this method of payment looks more akin to an 
hourly-wage arrangement for an employee.357 Nonetheless, the fact 
that record companies pay this amount at all has more to do with 
their agreement with the union rather than the relationship to the 
                                                                                                                                       
 347. MCPHERSON, supra note 341, at 61; SCHULENBERG, supra note 336, at 108. 
 348. See BURGESS, supra 329, at 171; SCHULENBERG, supra note 336, at 211-12. 
 349. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. j (1958). 
 350. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 39-40 (producers); id. at 203 (―[Re-
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 352. SCHULENBERG, supra note 336, at 121. 
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artist, which undercuts the force of this argument.358 But if payments 
are calculated by the per-side method, they appear to be payments by 
the job and artists are likely to be deemed independent contractors.359 
In sum, the method of payment factor overwhelmingly favors artists 
and producers being treated as independent contractors. 
 (b)   Group #2 
 Moving on to the second most important group of factors, the first 
factor to consider is whether the hiring party has the right to assign 
additional projects to the hired party. This factor probably favors art-
ists being treated as employees, but producers as independent con-
tractors. Most recording contracts are structured so the artist is re-
quired to create one album, but the record company is also given a 
series of options to extend the agreement for several more albums.360 
The number of options the record company has depends on the bar-
gaining power of the artist but five or six options are common.361 Un-
like artists, agreements between producers and record companies do 
not give the record company options to require the producer to pro-
duce another album.362 
 The second factor in this group is the skill required. This factor 
likely weighs in favor of artists and producers being independent con-
tractors. The record companies expend a tremendous amount of en-
ergy trying to find which artists to sign and which to pass on.363 Not 
every artist can fill the void in the market the record company is 
looking to capture and performing that sound can be quite a unique 
skill.364 The record companies seem to acknowledge this unique skill 
when they include provisions in the recording contracts that the art-
ists are of a special and unique character that gives them peculiar 
                                                                                                                                       
 358. This same argument could undercut record companies‘ positions with respect to 
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accompanying text. 
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 360. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 203 (―Many recording contracts call 
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value.365 Although drafted to allow record companies to obtain injunc-
tive relief if artists try to record for other record companies during 
their contracts, these provisions may likely be used to hoist the rec-
ord companies by their own petards. For producers, creating a sound 
recording is a highly-skilled job in that the producer not only needs to 
have a grand vision for what the album or record will sound like but 
also frequently makes musical suggestions to achieve that sound.366 
As with artists, the contracts between record companies and produc-
ers contain clauses providing that the producers and their skills are 
special and unique.367 
 The final factor in this group looks at the source of the instrumen-
talities and tools. This factor likely favors artists and producers or is 
neutral. Although record companies sometimes own their own record-
ing studios, it is rare that artists actually record there.368 If the re-
cording is done at an independent studio, this factor would be neu-
tral. However, sometimes the producer or even the artist owns the 
recording studio and equipment.369 In such a case, this factor could 
weigh in favor of the artists or producer being an independent con-
tractor. As far as providing the instruments used during the record-
ing sessions, these are normally owned by the artists and are some-
times purchased or paid off using the advance received from the rec-
ord company.370 
 (c)   Group #3 
 The third group of factors along the continuum of importance also 
has three factors. The first factor in this group is the extent of the 
hired party‘s discretion over when and how long to work. Who this 
factor benefits may very well depend on the stature of the artist or 
producer. Brand new artists and producers are given little control over 
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issues such as the time for recording.371 But over time, artists and pro-
ducers can secure control over this aspect of their recordings.372 
 The second factor in this group is whether the work is part of the 
regular business of the hiring party. This factor certainly favors the 
record companies.373 Record companies are, and always have been, 
in the business of creating or acquiring rights to sound recordings 
and having those recordings distributed.374 Recording the albums 
that will eventually be distributed falls perfectly in line with these 
business practices. 
 The final factor in this group is the duration of the relationship 
between the parties. Artists and producers will probably be treated 
differently with respect to this factor. As mentioned earlier, recording 
contracts with artists are typically for a certain number of albums, 
and the record company has several options to extend the relation-
ship.375 As a result, the exact duration of the relationship can be diffi-
cult to determine,376 but typically lasts for a period of several years,377 
although usually not more than five to seven years.378 These long du-
rations weigh in favor of artists being deemed employees. 
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 Producers, on the other hand, are not typically signed to agreements 
giving the record companies options to have producers work on subse-
quent albums. Instead, a producer‘s working relationship with the rec-
ord company is based upon the success of earlier recordings.379 Produc-
ers are almost always hired on a project basis rather than a number of 
years.380 In fact, sometimes producers are hired to work on a single song 
rather than an entire album.381 As a result, the duration factor weighs 
in favor of producers being treated as independent contractors. 
 (d)   Group #4 
 Moving on to the less important end of the continuum, there are 
two factors to consider. The first factor is the location of the work. 
This factor likely weighs in favor of artists and producers as inde-
pendent contractors. Although record companies may have their own 
in-house studios382 and prefer that they be used,383 it is rare for artists 
to record at those studios.384 Instead, the record companies try to in-
clude a provision in their contracts giving the record company the right 
of final approval of the recording studio.385 In practice, the record com-
panies will approve any legitimate studio.386 Given that very few re-
cordings occur at the record companies‘ studios, that the choice of the 
recording studio is made by artists and producers,387 and that the rec-
ord companies rarely exercise their ability to veto a location, this factor 
probably favors artists and producers as independent contractors. 
 The second factor in this group is the hired party‘s role in hiring 
and paying assistants. This factor probably weighs in favor of artists 
and, to a lesser extent, producers being independent contractors, but 
may depend on the use of a recording fund and recoupment. In terms 
of selecting those who contribute to the recording, the artists and 
producers typically choose which engineers, non-featured musicians, 
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and non-featured vocalists to hire.388 The selection of the producer is 
a bit more involved. To the record company, selection of the producer 
is one of the more important provisions of the recording contract.389 
These provisions usually state that the producer will be mutually se-
lected by the artist and record company.390 In practice, however, the 
artist selects the producer, the record company consults and general-
ly defers to the artist unless the record company has had a bad expe-
rience with the artist‘s choice.391 Thus, it appears that artists and 
producers play a large role in hiring assistants. 
 Paying for those assistants is a bit more complicated. Today, art-
ists pay for third parties out of a recording fund.392 Under this ap-
proach, the recording costs and artist‘s advance are combined into a 
single fund, and the artist is responsible for paying all recording 
costs out of this fund.393 Any money leftover is the artist‘s to keep as 
an advance.394 As a result of this payment scheme, recording con-
tracts include clauses specifying that the artist is solely responsible 
for paying all third party charges incurred in the production of the 
record.395 Because the artist‘s advance and recording costs are com-
bined into one fund that is delivered to the artist to administer396 and 
the contract provisions describe the artist as being responsible for 
payment, it appears that this factor weighs in favor of the artist be-
ing an independent contractor. 
 Although the recording fund is more common today, it was com-
mon for the artist (especially a new artist) to be paid a separate ad-
vance and for the recording company to pay the recording costs.397 
Although this arrangement suggests that the record companies paid 
for assistants, it is important to remember that all of the recording 
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costs are treated as advances to the artist.398 As a result, these costs 
are recoupable from the artist‘s royalties.399 Because of this, if the 
artist earns a sufficient amount of royalties, it is the artist, not the 
record company, who pays for the recording costs.400 Of course, if the 
artist is never successful, then the record company will not recoup 
these costs and will end up paying for them. Who ultimately pays for 
the assistants under the older method of payment depends on wheth-
er the artist‘s album is a commercial success.  
 In sum, this factor probably weighs in favor of artists and, to a 
lesser extent, producers being independent contractors. Regardless of 
how these assistants are paid, the artist and producer choose who 
works on the recording. When a recording fund is used, the case for 
independent contractor is strengthened. However, if the record com-
pany did not use a recording fund and the costs are not recouped, 
then the record company will have a stronger argument that this fac-
tor weighs in favor of the artist and producer being employees. 
 (e)   Group #5 
 Concluding with the least important group of factors, the first fac-
tor to consider is the right to control the manner and means by which 
the product is accomplished. Whether this factor weighs in favor of 
artists and producers being independent contractors or employees is 
difficult to determine. Prior to the 1970s, record companies exercised 
a large amount of creative control over the recording process, but 
since then, artists and producers have moved away from an in-house 
creative process and are exercising more creative control in record-
ing.401 Today, for newer artists and producers, the record companies 
may have language in the recording contracts requiring the artist 
and producer to submit written recording budgets specifying who the 
producer is and the financial agreement between the artist and pro-
ducer, the songs to be recorded, the accompaniment and arrangement 
of the recordings, any recording fees that will exceed union scale, the 
dates and locations of the recordings and mixing, and the estimated 
costs of these sessions.402 Despite this contract language, in practice, 
                                                                                                                                       
 398. BRABEC & BRABEC, supra note 394, at 88-89. 
 399. Id.; SIEGEL, supra note 363, at 112 (―Although the record company will pay the 
recording costs initially, it will charge them to [the artist] as advances against [the artist‘s] 
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 402. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 340. 
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written recording budgets are not always submitted or followed.403 
More experienced artists and producers may, however, secure more 
control over the creative process, including the selection of music, re-
cording location and time, final sound mix, and recording budgets.404 
As a general matter, the record companies may have a better chance 
at artists and producers being employees under the right to control 
factor when the artists and producers are inexperienced. But the 
amount of control over the creative process wanes as artists and pro-
ducers get more experience. 
 Specific components of recording that are important in the crea-
tive process are controlling music selection, monitoring what takes 
place during recording sessions, and selecting where the recording 
occurs. For music selection, the standard recording contract provides 
that the record company will select the music to be recorded.405 But in 
practice, the record company gives the artist a say in the decision.406 
It is common today for the record company to only reserve a right of 
approval of the music selection.407 This is especially true for more 
seasoned artists.408 That said, there are actually very few disputes 
about song choice.409 
 With respect to where the recording occurs, as discussed in con-
nection with the work location, record companies try to include 
clauses giving the record company approval rights of the recording 
studio.410 In practice, the producer will normally choose the studio to 
work in,411 and the record companies will approve any legitimate stu-
dio.412 In addition to where the recording occurs, recording contracts 
typically contain a provision that the record company has the right to 
have a representative present to supervise the recording session.413 
                                                                                                                                       
 403. Id. 
 404. See SIEGEL, supra note 363, at 122-23. 
 405. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 332; KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra 
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Nonetheless, it is very rare for record companies to actually send a 
representative to the studio to supervise.414 
 Although it appears that record companies actually exercise very 
little control over the creative process, they do reserve the right to do 
so in the recording contracts they enter into with artists and produc-
ers. As this factor really focuses on the right to control instead of ac-
tual control, which was rejected by the Supreme Court in Reid, it is 
likely that this factor will weigh in favor of artists and producers be-
ing considered employees. 
 The second factor in this group is the label the hired and hiring 
party use to describe the hired party. This factor certainly weighs in 
favor of artists and producers being deemed employees. Nearly every 
recording contract written since 1978 states that the works created 
by artists and producers are works made for hire.415 Although many 
of the terms of a recording contract are negotiable, this one is not.416  
 The final factor in the least important group of factors is whether 
the hiring party is in business. Record companies are obviously in 
business.417 This factor clearly weighs in favor of the artists and pro-
ducers being employees. 
 (f)   Conclusions for the Music Industry 
 Table 6, below, summarizes the analysis of the Reid factors as ap-
plied to sound recordings in the music industry. This table sorts the 
factors by order of importance. A checkmark indicates this factor 
likely weighs in favor of that party‘s favored position (i.e. independ-
ent contractor for artist and producers, employees for record compa-
nies). A question mark indicates that it is unclear which way that 
factor applies. 
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Table 6 – Summary of Sound Recording Analysis 
Factor Artists Producers 
Record  
Companies 
Tax Treatment    
Employee Benefits ?  ? (artists) 
Payment Method    
Additional Projects    (artists) 
Skill Required    
Source of  
Instrumentalities & Tools  or neutral  or neutral  
When & How Long  
to Work 
? – new 
 – established 
? – new 
 – established 
? (new artists & 
producers) 
Part of Regular Business 
of Hiring Party    
Relationship Duration    (artists) 
Work Location    
Hiring & Paying  
Assistants    
Right to Control  
Manner & Means    
Label    
Hiring Party in Business    
 
 As illustrated in Table 6, it is nearly certain that producers will be 
treated as independent contractors. Five, and possibly six, of the 
most important factors weigh in favor of producers as independent 
contractors. In fact, the only factors suggesting producers would be 
employees are the part of the regular business of the hiring party and 
the three least important factors on the continuum. 
 The case for artists is more difficult. Nonetheless, it is more likely 
that artists will be deemed independent contractors. Of the three 
most important factors, two clearly weigh in favor of artists as inde-
pendent contractors. The other factor (employee benefits) is unclear. 
As described earlier, when a party has two of these three factors in 
its favor, the courts find in favor of that party eighty-seven percent of 
the time.418 Expanding this to the next group of factors, one favors 
the record companies, one favors the artists, and the remaining fac-
tor either favors the artists or is neutral. If a court were to rule that 
either the employee benefits or source of the instrumentalities factor 
favored the artists, then a majority of the top six factors would favor 
the artists. As described earlier, when a party has a majority of these 
six factors in its favor, the courts find in favor of that party ninety-
one percent of the time.419 The next group of factors favors the record 
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companies when the artist is new and is split two to one when the 
artist is established. This group is helpful to the record companies, 
but they face an uphill battle given that the more important factors 
favor artists. The fourth group of factors favors artists, which tips the 
scales slightly more towards artists being considered independent 
contractors. However, the least important factors all support the rec-
ord companies. Of course, these are the least important factors, so 
their utility to the record company is of little value. Given the results 
of the most and second-most important groups of factors, this will 
likely carry the day and artists will be deemed independent contrac-
tors. That said, the record companies have a colorable argument that 
artists should be treated as employees, and this argument should not 
be considered futile.420 Hopefully, the results of this study and the 
analysis above provide a useful roadmap for litigants and judges nav-
igating the upcoming termination of transfer cases. 
 3.   Business Planning 
 In addition to assisting litigators to evaluate and present their 
cases, the results of this study will aid business planners in structur-
ing relationships between hiring and hired parties. For example, if a 
hiring party seeks initial ownership of the copyright, it will be best 
advised to withhold income taxes and issue a W2 rather than a 1099, 
provide employee benefits such as life and health insurance, and pay 
the hired party at regularly intervals. To further ensure a work made 
for hire result, the hiring party could also include a provision in the 
agreement that reserves the right for the hiring party to assign addi-
tional projects to the hired party. And although difficult to control in 
some circumstances, the hiring party should provide as many of the 
tools as possible. Structuring the relationship this way forces the 
three most important factors and one or two of the factors in the se-
cond group to weigh in favor of employee status. This should all but 
assure a conclusion that the hired party will be an employee. 
 Likewise, for attorneys representing hired parties who would like 
to retain initial ownership—to take advantage of the termination of 
transfer provisions or to further exploit the copyright—they should 
insist on the hiring party not withholding taxes and issuing a 1099, 
refuse insurance coverage, and demand payment upon completion of 
projects or portions of projects. Submitting invoices to the hiring par-
ty upon completion would be a wise practice to adopt. Moreover, re-
sisting a provision to accept additional projects and actually refusing 
additional projects until a new agreement is established for a new 
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project will place the hired party in a strong position to argue that 
she is an independent contractor. 
 Of course, negotiating these terms may heavily depend on bar-
gaining power. A weak hired party may not be able to demand that 
no additional projects be assigned. Likewise, a weak hiring party 
may not be able to insist that the hired party work on the hiring par-
ty‘s premises. But knowing where the various factors lie on the con-
tinuum may help the attorney for the weaker party focus on specific 
factors that the stronger party may be willing to budge on. If choos-
ing between asking the stronger party to capitulate with respect to a 
provision about where the hired party will physically work and a 
provision concerning the hours of the day the hired party must work, 
the attorney for the weaker party should focus negotiation efforts on 
the working hours provision, because it is more important than the 
work location factor. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Drawing a distinction between employees and independent con-
tractors in the work made for hire doctrine is a challenging endeavor, 
but one that strikes at the heart of many copyright disputes. After a 
quarter century of cases applying and interpreting the Supreme 
Court‘s multifactor test from CCNV v. Reid, this Article gives the 
first comprehensive study of this multifactor test and answers the 
question of which factors are the most and least important in these 
analyses. Some of the results are surprising while other results are 
expected. But regardless of how these results conform to our expecta-
tions, they will prove useful to the bench and bar involved in copy-
right litigation and for business planning attorneys advising their 
clients how to accomplish their copyright ownership goals. 
